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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I; The first point of the Appellees' brief is that 
"There Are No Genuine Issues As to Appellants7 Cause of Action for 
Breach of Contract." Within Point I are three subpoints. The 
first subpoint is that it is undisputed that the Appellees did not 
enter into a contract with the Appellants. The basis for this 
argument is the simple, undisputed fact that the contract 
("Agreement and Escrow") that the Appellants claim the Appellees 
breached, and the documents incorporated with the "Agreement and 
Escrow", were not signed by or for the Appellees. It is also an 
undisputed fact that the parties who did sign these documents were 
careful to state in what capacity they were signing. The 
Appellants7 attempt to create a factual dispute by presenting the 
Affidavit of Walter Park Larson, which states that Bruno and Gay 
(the parties who did sign the written documents) did so as agents 
of the Appellees. The parol evidence rule prevents the Appellants 
from introducing evidence that would vary or contradict the terms 
of the written documents. As the Affidavit of Walter Park Larson 
contradicts and varies the terms of the written documents by 
claiming that the Appellees, and not the others, are bound and 
obligated by the terms of the contract, by operation of the parol 
evidence rule, the Affidavit does not create a factual issue that 
the Appellees were parties to the written agreements. 
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The second subpoint is that it is undisputed that the 
Appellees' contractual obligations, if any, are subject to an 
unfulfilled condition precedent. The purchasers under the contract 
were purchasing an automobile dealership known as "Larson Ford." 
Prior to the signing of the "Agreement and Escrow", Larson Ford had 
filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code, and had a 120-day exclusive right to file a Plan of 
Reorganization. According to the written documents in this case, 
(a) the closing date of the "Agreement and Escrow" was to be within 
ten (10) days from the date the bankruptcy court confirmed Larson 
Ford/s plan of reorganization; and (b) if the bankruptcy court did 
not approve Larson's Ford's plan, the purchasers had the right to 
rescind the "Agreement and Escrow". As it is undisputed that the 
bankruptcy court did not approve Larson Ford's plan of 
reorganization, it is equally undisputed that the purchasers' 
obligations under the "Agreement and Escrow" and incorporated 
documents never arose as they were subject to an unfulfilled 
condition precedent. 
The third subsection is that pursuant to the Amendment to the 
"Agreement and Escrow" it is undisputed that the purchasers had the 
right to cease active pursuit of Larson Ford's plan of 
reorganization. The Amendment to the "Agreement and Escrow" 
provides that the purchasers had the absolute right to cease active 
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pursuit of the plan of reorganization of Larson Ford. Even if 
there is a factual dispute as to whether the Appellees were parties 
to the contract, summary judgment is still proper as the written 
documents allowed the purchasers the right to cease their efforts 
to purchase Larson Ford. 
POINT II; The second point of the Appellees' Brief is 
that "There Is No Genuine Dispute That the Appellees Did Not Make 
Careless and/or Negligent Misrepresentations." This point contains 
four subsections. 
The first subsection is that the Appellants' claim of 
negligent and/or careless misrepresentations is barred by the parol 
evidence rule. The misrepresentations claimed by the Appellants 
are actually the contractual terms of the Addendum to the 
"Agreement and Escrow". As it is undisputed that the Appellees are 
not parties to those documents, it is undisputed that the Appellees 
could not have made misrepresentations. 
The second subsection is that it is undisputed that negligent 
misrepresentations cannot apply in the instant case. For negligent 
misrepresentations to apply, there must be a special confidential 
relationship. Based upon the Appellants' own discovery answers, it 
is undisputed that the transaction in question was an arms-length 
transaction. 
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The third subsection of Point II is that it is undisputed that 
the Appellees did not misrepresent facts to the Appellants. As 
Appellant Walter P. Larson testified in deposition and in his 
answers to interrogatories that the alleged misrepresentations were 
made by an individual who did not have the authority to bind the 
Appellees, it is undisputed that the Appellees did not misrepresent 
facts to the Appellants. 
The fourth subsection of Point II is that it is undisputed 
that the Appellants did not rely on representations of the 
Appellees in entering into the "Agreement and Escrow". Reliance is 
an element of negligence and/or careless misrepresentation. As it 
is undisputed that the Appellees made no misrepresentations to the 
Appellants, it is undisputed that the Appellants did not rely on 
the statements of the Appellees. 
POINT III: The third point of the Appellees7 Brief is that 
"On the Basis of the Appellants7 Own Deposition Testimony and 
Answers to Interrogatories, It Is Undisputed That the Appellees 
Were Not Part of a Scheme to Defraud the Appellants". The third 
cause of action of the Appellants7 Amended Complaint (which should 
have properly been denominated Second Amended Complaint) was that 
the Appellees had conspired with a third party. The conspiracy was 
that the Appellees would pretend to be interested in purchasing 
Larson Ford. The Appellees would deplete the resources of Larson 
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Ford, then would fail to proceed with the purchase of Larson Ford, 
which would then allow their co-conspirator to purchase the assets 
of Larson Ford at a reduced price. Appellant Walter P. Larson was 
asked in deposition what evidence he had to support this plan of 
collusion with the alleged co-conspirator, Stephen Wade. The 
Appellants were also asked by way of interrogatories what evidence 
they had to support these allegations. In Walter P. Larson's 
deposition testimony, as well as in the answers to interrogatories, 
the Appellants failed to set forth any admissible evidence that 
would support the allegation that the Appellees had conspired to 
deplete the assets of Larson Ford. 
POINT IV: The fourth point of the Appellees' Brief is 
that "The Appellants Incorrectly Assert That the Lower Court Was 
Unable to Rule Decisively". In their brief, the Appellants claim 
that the trial court was unable to rule decisively. The Appellees 
first brought a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the 
dismissal of the cause of action for carelessly and/or negligently 
made misrepresentations. That motion was granted. The Appellees 
then brought another Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the 
dismissal of the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. 
That motion was also granted. The Appellants then approached the 
court and requested permission to amend their Complaint so as to 
allow them to bring forth the cause of action that the Appellees 
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had conspired with a third party to drive down the price of Larson 
Ford. The court allowed the requested amendment. The complaint 
the Appellants filed contained not only the new cause of action, 
but also the two old causes of action, breach of contract and 
carelessly and/or negligently made misrepresentations. The 
Appellees then brought a Motion for Summary Judgment. That motion 
was denied. In the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated July 7, 1992, the court indicated that the reason for the 
denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment was that the court was of 
the opinion that the Appellants had not had sufficient time in 
which to develop their theory that the Appellees were trying to 
deplete the assets of Larson Ford. As the court allowed the 
Appellants to amend their complaint after having granted the 
Appellees two motions for summary judgment, and then allowed the 
Appellants sufficient time in which to develop their theory of 
conspiracy, it is correct to say that the trial court not only 
ruled decisively, but also gave every opportunity to the Appellants 
to present a factual dispute. 
POINT V; The final point of the Appellees' Brief is that 
"The Appellees Have Not Made the Admissions Attributed To Them By 
the Appellants". In their brief, the Appellants claim that the 
Appellees have made certain admissions. By virtue of the 
Appellees' Answers to Request for Admissions and their Amended 
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Answers to Request for Admissions, it is undisputed that the 
Appellees did not make the admissions attributed to them by the 
Appellants. 
DATED this /tfi" day of February, 1993. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
ry Caston 
torneys for Appellees 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Rule 56(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after 
the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof." 
2. Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence 
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall 
if practicable ascertain what material facts 
exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent 
to which the amount of damages or other relief 
is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. 
Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Appellants claim the lower court erred in granting 
the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment date May 26, 1992. 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT 
BELOW, 
1. On or about July 1, 1983, Appellants filed their 
Complaint. (Index pp. 2-9). 
2. The Complaint contained two causes of action. The 
first cause of action alleged breach of contract. The second cause 
of action sought relief based on "carelessly and/or negligently 
made false representations made by the defendants". 
3. The Appellees moved the lower court for a dismissal 
of the second cause of action or, in the alternative, for a more 
definite statement as the Appellants had failed to properly plead 
the elements of fraud as required by Rule 9B of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (Index pp. 77-80). 
4. On May 29, 1984, the lower court granted Appellees' 
motion for a more definite statement and allowed the Appellants 10 
days to amend their complaint. 
5. Appellants filed their amended complaint within the 
time provided by the court. 
6. As did the original complaint, the Amended Complaint 
contained causes of action for breach of the contract known as the 
"Agreement and Escrow" and for "carelessly and/or negligently made 
false representations". (Index pp. 111-118). 
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7. In August of 1988 the Appellees moved the Court for 
partial summary judgment on the cause of action for carelessly 
and/or negligently made false misrepresentations. The points 
presented in the supporting memorandum were that: 
(a) the Appellees did not misrepresent facts to the 
Appellants; 
(b) the Appellants did not rely on representations of 
the Appellees in entering into the agreement and 
escrow; 
(c) the Appellees did not act knowingly and recklessly; 
and 
(d) the Appellants had not pled fraud with specificity. 
(Index pp. 283-292). 
8. On August 26, 1988 the lower court granted the 
Appellees' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
9. The Appellants then moved the Court for Summary 
Judgment on the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. The 
Points and Authorities in Support of that motion (Index pp. 339-
359) contended, based on the Appellants' own deposition testimony 
and the relevant documents, that it was undisputed that: 
(a) the Appellees never entered into a contract with 
the Appellants; 
3 
(b) even if the Appellees had contracted with the 
Appellants, the Appellees' obligations were subject 
to an unfulfilled condition precedent in that the 
"Amendment" to the contract provided that the 
purchasers could "...cease active pursuit of the 
plan of reorganization of Larson Ford, Inc."; and 
(c) in fact the contract had not been breached. 
10. On October 7, 1988, the lower court, ruling from the 
bench, granted the Second Motion for Summary Judgment. (Index pp. 
436, 437). 
11. The Appellants then claimed that there was a new 
theory that their previous counsel had failed to advance. The new 
theory was that the Appellees were part of a scheme to defraud the 
Appellants. (Index 446-456). 
12. The Court granted the Appellants' Motion to File an 
Amended Complaint to allow the Appellants to pursue this new 
theory. 
13. The Appellants' Amended Complaint (which should have 
properly been denominated Second Amended Complaint) contains three 
causes of action. The first two causes of action are the same as 
were contained in the original Complaint and the (first) Amended 
Complaint. These causes of action are breach of the contract dated 
March 5, 1983, and negligent misrepresentation. The third cause of 
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action alleges fraud. The third cause of action is where the 
Appellants allege that the Appellees acted in collusion with 
Stephen Wade to deplete Larson Ford's assets which would then allow 
Wade to purchase the entity at a reduced price. (Index pp. 487-
573) . 
14. Following the Appellants filing the Amended 
Complaint, the Appellees again moved the lower court for Summary 
Judgment. (Index pp. 593-593H). The court did not grant the 
Appellees' motion as the court was of the opinion that at the time 
the Appellees had brought the motion, the Appellants had not had 
sufficient time in which to pursue the matters set forth in the 
Amended Complaint. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 7). 
15. On the 27th day of May, 1992 the Appellees filed 
their final Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 12, 1992 the 
court heard oral argument on the Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Ruling from the bench, the court granted the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and 
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment were signed and entered 
on July 7, 1992, and are attached hereto as Addendum A and B. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED BEFORE REVIEW 
The Appellants claim that the lower court erred in granting 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 27, 1992. As the 
Amended Complaint contained the same two causes of action (breach 
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of contract and carelessly and/or negligently made false 
misrepresentations) that had been dismissed by the court, the 
Appellees incorporated the memoranda they had previously submitted. 
These memoranda are found as Addendum C, D and E. The memoranda 
that was filed on May 27, 1992 (which is included as Addendum F) 
presented the undisputed facts that warranted dismissal of the new 
cause of action - fraud. In the three subsections below, the 
Appellees set forth the undisputed facts that were presented to the 
lower court for each of the Appellants' three causes of action; 
breach of contract, carelessly and/or negligently made false 
misrepresentations, and the alleged scheme to defraud the 
Appellants. 
A. UNDISPUTED FACTS RELATED TO BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
1. Appellants in their Amended Complaint allege that 
the Appellees breached the contract known as the "Agreement and 
Escrow11. 
2. The "Agreement and Escrow" (which is Exhibit A to 
Addendum C) was entered into on March 5, 1983, between Appellant 
Walter P. Larson as Seller, Larson Ford Sales, Inc., and HBGH, an 
intended corporation, as Seller. 
3. Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis W. Gay signed the 
"Agreement and Escrow" on behalf of HBGH, an intended corporation 
(Exhibit A of Addendum C). 
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4. Prior to entering into the "Agreement and Escrow", 
Larson Ford Sales had filed for relief pursuant to Chapter 11 of 
the United State Bankruptcy Code. 
5. Pursuant to paragraphs E and F of the "Agreement and 
Escrow": 
"...the time for closing of this Agreement 
shall be ten days from the date of 
confirmation of the Larson Ford Sales plan of 
reorganization by the Bankruptcy 
Court... Purchasers shall have the right to 
rescind the purchase agreement and escrow in 
the event that the Larson Ford Sales plan of 
reorganization is not approved by the 
Bankruptcy Court. Upon occurrence of this 
event, the Purchasers have the right to 
rescind this Agreement." (Exhibit A of 
Addendum C). 
6. The "Agreement and Escrow" incorporated an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum of February 4, 
1983. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum 
were agreements between Bruno, Gay and/or their assigns, and 
Appellant Walter P. Larson (Exhibits B & C of Addendum C). 
7. Pursuant to the Addendum the offer was subject to 
the "...approval of the Federal Bankruptcy Court" (Exhibit C of 
Addendum C). 
8. Concurrently with the execution of the "Agreement 
and Escrow", Bruno and Gay entered into an Amendment with Appellant 
Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford Sales, Inc. (Exhibit D of Addendum 
C). Paragraph 1 of the Amendment states that: 
"It is agreed that the stock voting rights 
will be reconveyed to Walter P. Larson in the 
event the purchasers cause active pursuit of 
the Plan of Reorganization of Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. (emphasis added). 
9. Pursuant to Section 1121 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Codef Larson Ford Sales had a 120-day exclusive period 
in which to file a plan of reorganization. 
10. Pursuant to Section 1121 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, after the expiration of the 120-day period in 
which Larson Ford Sales had an exclusive right to file a plan of 
reorganization, any interested party could file a plan of 
reorganization. 
11. The Purchasers' obligation under the "Agreement and 
Escrow" were "contingent on the Bankruptcy Court's approval of a 
plan of reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc." 
12. The Bankruptcy Court did note approve the plan of 
reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
13. The Bankruptcy Court did approve the second plan of 
reorganization submitted by Stephen Wade. 
14. From March 21, 1983, HBGH supplied in excess of 
$150,000 to Larson Ford Sales.1 (Affidavit of Owen Hogle, Index 
360 and Addendum G). 
1
 Oddly, on page 8 of their Brief, Appellants state, "In 
fact, it must be noted that Appellees never filed any affidavit in 
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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15. In paragraph 36 of the Amended Complaint the 
Appellants allege that the Appellees had the obligation to "support 
plaintiff's plan to the Bankruptcy Court on the terms agreed to 
with the plaintiffs...and not vote for a competing plan." 
16. The "Agreement and Escrow" and documents 
incorporated into the "Agreement and Escrow": 
(a) do not set forth the terms of the bankruptcy 
plan that the Appellants and Appellees allegedly 
had agreed upon; and 
(b) do not state that the Appellees were prevented 
from voting for a competing plan of reorganization 
if the Bankruptcy Court rejected Larson Ford's plan 
of reorganization. 
17. The Appellees were not obligated by or parties to 
any of the aforementioned agreements. (Exhibits A, B and C of 
Addendum C)• 
18. The Appellees were never the assigns of Bruno and 
Gay. (Affidavit of Owen Hogle, Index 360-361 and Addendum G). 
19. The Appellees were not and have never been officers, 
directors or shareholders of HBGH. (Affidavit of Owen Hogle, Index 
360-361 and Addendum G). 
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20. The Appellants were aware that HBGH was to become a 
corporation and dealt with HBGH as a corporation. (Deposition of 
Sybil Larson, page 11, line 8; Addendum H). 
21. HBGH became a corporation on March 22, 1983. 
(Exhibit E of Addendum C) 
B. FACTS RELATED TO NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
22. In paragraphs 41 through 43 of the Amended 
Complaint, Appellants allege that Bruno and Gay, while acting as 
agents of the Appellees, made negligent or careless 
misrepresentations to the Appellants. 
23. In paragraphs 45(a) through (e) of the Amended 
Complaint, Appellants set forth six misrepresentations that the 
Appellees through "action, conduct, and words" made to the 
Appellants. At least four of those alleged misrepresentations 
refer to promises to perform certain acts in the future. The 
alleged misrepresentations do not refer to then existing facts. 
Further Appellants do not specify which misrepresentations were 
made by actions and conduct and which were made by "words." 
24. On May 21, 1987, the Appellees took the deposition 
of Appellant Walter P. Larson. Appellant Larson was asked numerous 
questions concerning the Appellees' alleged false 
misrepresentations. Appellant Larson testified that (a) the 
alleged misrepresentations were the Appellees' "failure to perform 
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on the basis of the agreement we'd drawn up..,11 (page 51, lines 17, 
24; page 52, lines 4-7; page 53, lines 15-24; page 57, line 25; 
page 58, lines 3-5); (b) misrepresentations were made by an 
individual who had no authority to bind the Appellees (page 53, 
lines 24, 15; page 54, lines 1-7); (c) the basis for its claim that 
the Appellees knew their alleged misrepresentations were false when 
they were made was that Appellee Owen Hogle was not present during 
the "final negotiating..." (page 58, lines 18-22) and that "they 
didn't follow through with it" (page 58, lines 8 and 9). (Pages 
51, 52, 53, 57 and 58 are attached as Addendum I). 
25. Appellant Larson did not have with him at the time 
of the deposition any documentary evidence which would support his 
claim that the Appellees knew the alleged misrepresentations were 
false when made, but he would supply such evidence to Appellees' 
counsel (page 61, lines 8, 25; page 62, lines 1-3; Addendum J). 
26. The Appellees never received any documentary 
evidence from the Appellants regarding Appellants' claims that the 
defendants knew the alleged misrepresentations were false when 
made. 
27. On February 16, 1988, the Appellees served upon the 
Appellants Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. 
28. Interrogatory No. 6 of Appellees' Interrogatories 
asked the Appellants to state each and every fact which supports 
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Appellants' claim that the Appellees made fraudulent 
misrepresentations and to identify and produce each and every 
document which supported its claim that the defendants made 
fraudulent misrepresentations. 
29. In response to Interrogatory No. 6, Appellants 
stated that an individual had made "claims and assurances that the 
Appellees had "wealth" and that other "contacts" had stated that 
the Appellees' name was "reliable and respected." Appellant Walter 
P. Larson had testified at his deposition that the individual did 
not have the authority to bind the Appellees. 
C. FACTS RELATED TO FRAUD. 
31. The Appellants' third cause of action alleges that 
the Appellees: 
(a) Fraudulently represented that "they are 
presently capable and interested in purchasing 
Larson Ford" in order to induce the Appellants to 
sell Larson Ford; 
(b) Were involved in a scheme in which the 
defendants planned to deplete Appellants' 
resources, after which another individual in 
collusion with the Appellees would purchase 
Appellants' assets at a greatly reduced price. 
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32. At the deposition of Appellant Walter P. Larson on 
May 21, 1987, Appellant Larson was asked if he had any "evidence 
whatsoever that there was any collusion with Stephen Wade and the 
defendants" After a conference with his attorney, the Appellant 
stated, on page 13, lines 8 through 17 (Addendum K) , that his 
evidence of collusion consisted of Appellant being told at a date 
he could not remember and from a person whom he could not recall 
that: 
"Wades and the Hogles had been in contact with 
each other with the idea that was discussed 
being the fact that Wade had an inside track 
of some kind with Ford that they would be 
approved as the dealer that if the Hogle group 
wanted to protect the investment that they had 
made the dealership to that point and time in 
order to have the cooperation of the Wades 
were they successful in getting a creditor/s 
plan accepted, the whole group wanted to et 
their money out, that they would withdraw." 
33. On January 28, 1992 the Appellees served the 
Appellants with a set of Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents. Interrogatory No. 4 asked the Appellants to set 
forth the factual basis upon which they claimed that the Appellees 
had participated in a plan to deplete the resources of Larson Ford 
so as to allow a co-conspirator to purchase the assets of Larson 
Ford at a greatly reduced price. In Appellants' answer to 
Interrogatory No. 4 (Addendum L) , the Appellants set forth 
absolutely no admissible evidence that there was any collusion 
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whatsoever between the Appellees and any other party to deplete the 
assets of Larson Ford. 
34. On June 11, 1992, one day prior to the hearing on 
the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Appellants filed their 
responsive memorandum and the Affidavit of Walter Park Larson 
(Addendum M) . The Affidavit does not indicate that the statements 
are made upon personal knowledge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 12 THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES AS TO APPELLANTS' CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
A. It Is Undisputed That the Appellees Did Not Enter Into A 
Contract With The Appellants. 
The first cause of action of the Appellants' Amended Complaint 
alleges a breach of the "Agreement and Escrow" dated March 5, 1983. 
For the Appellees to have breached this contract, they must have 
been parties to that contract. It is undisputed that Appellees 
James and Owen Hogle are not parties to the "Agreement and Escrow". 
The "Agreement and Escrow" is between HBGH, Inc. as purchaser and 
Walter Park Larson as seller. Stephen Bruno and Dennis Gay signed 
the agreement on behalf of HBGH, an "intended corporation". At the 
time the agreement was signed, HBGH was not a corporation. HBGH 
was incorporated on March 22, 1983. Appellant Sybil Larson stated 
in her deposition that the appellants were aware HBGH was to become 
a corporation, and treated it as such. 
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The "Agreement and Escrow" incorporated an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum dated February 4, 1983. 
The Appellees are not parties to either of those documents. The 
parties to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase were 
Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis W. Gay and/or assigns, and Appellant 
Walter P. Larson. The parties to the Addendum are Walter P. Larson 
for Larson Ford Sales and Stephen B. Bruno. As was stated in 
Appellee Owen Hogle's Affidavit, the Appellees were never the 
assigns of Bruno, Gay or HBGH. 
There is an Amendment to the "Agreement and Escrow" of March 
5, 1983. That Amendment is between Stephen B. Bruno and Dennis Gay 
as buyers and Appellants Walter P. Larson and Walter P. Larson, 
president of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
The parol evidence rule as set forth in FMA Financial 
Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), 
prevents the Appellants from introducing any evidence that would 
contradict or vary the terms of the written agreements. There is 
one caveat to the parol evidence rule. A party may introduce 
evidence that is collateral to the written agreement. The 
collateral evidence may not be inconsistent with or repudiate the 
terms of the written agreement. 
Appellants claim that the Appellees were parties to the March 
5, 1983 Agreement by virtue of representations made to the 
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Appellants by agents of the Appellees. This assertion contradicts 
and varies the terms of the written agreements. The Appellants may 
not make use of the caveat to the parol evidence rule. The 
Agreement of March 5, 1983 (and other documentation in this case) 
is void of even the slightest indication that the Appellees were 
parties to the contract. To claim otherwise is inconsistent and 
varies an essential term of the March 5, 1983 Agreement. 
It is significant to note that the parties who signed the 
"Agreement and Escrow" and other documents did specify the capacity 
in which they were signing each document. On numerous documents, 
Appellant Walter P. Larson signed for himself and for Larson Ford 
Sales, inc. Gay and Bruno signed on their behalf and on behalf of 
HBGH. No document was signed on behalf of the Appellees. 
B. It Is Undisputed That The Appellees' Contractual 
Obligations, If Any, Are Subject To An Unfulfilled 
Condition Precedent. 
If the Court finds that there is a factual dispute as to 
whether the Appellees are parties to the "Agreement and Escrow", 
summary judgment on the cause of action for breach of contract is 
still proper. Pursuant to the contractual documents, the 
purchasers obligations were subject to an unfulfilled condition 
precedent. The case of Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1979) 
is an example of where an individual's obligations to a contract do 
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not arise due to an unfulfilled condition precedent. In Creer the 
plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant to purchase 
a parcel of real estate. The court found that the plaintiff knew 
that there was a possibility that the defendant's ability to convey 
title was based on a contingency. The contingency did not occur 
and the defendant was unable to convey title. The court, in 
holding that the defendant's contractual obligation had not arisen, 
stated: 
"Whether a provision in a contract is a 
condition, the non-fulfillment of which 
excuses performance, depends upon the intent 
of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair 
and reasonable construction of the language 
used in light of all the circumstances when 
they executed the contract." Id. at 51. 
Should this court find that there is a factual dispute as to 
whether the Appellees are parties to the contract, summary judgment 
is still proper as the Appellees cannot be liable for a breach of 
contract as it is undisputed that the purchasers' contractual 
obligations are subject to a condition precedent that was never 
satisfied. Prior to the Agreement of March 5, 1983, Larson Ford 
Sales had filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code. The Appellants had, in accordance with Section 
1121 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 120 days from the date 
they filed for relief in which to file their own bankruptcy plan. 
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Pursuant to paragraphs E and F of the March 5, 1983 "Agreement 
and Escrow", the closing date was to be within ten (10) days from 
the date the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Plan of Reorganization 
submitted by Larson Ford Sales. Pursuant to the "Agreement and 
Escrow", if the Bankruptcy Court did not approve the plan of Larson 
Ford Sales, the purchasers had the right to "rescind the purchase 
"Agreement and Escrow". It is undisputed that the Bankruptcy Court 
did not approve the plan submitted by Larson Ford. 
Once the 120-day period in which the debtor has an exclusive 
right to file a bankruptcy plan has expired, any other party in 
interest may file a bankruptcy plan. Once the bankruptcy court 
approves a plan of an interested party, a debtor can no longer file 
his own plan. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Stephen 
Wade, as a party in interest, submitted a bankruptcy plan. Wade's 
first plan was rejected. Wade submitted a second plan which was 
then approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As it is undisputed that 
the obligation to purchase Larson Ford was contingent upon the 
Bankruptcy Court's approval of a plan submitted by Larson Ford, and 
as it is undisputed that the Bankruptcy Court did not approve 
Larson Ford's plan, it is also undisputed that the purchasers' 
obligation to purchase Larson Ford was subject to an unfulfilled 
condition precedent. 
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C. Pursuant to the "Amendment" to the "Agreement and 
Escrow", It Is Undisputed That the Purchasers Had the 
Right to Cease Active Pursuit of Larson Ford's Plan of 
Reorganization. 
Should the Court find that there are factual disputes as to 
whether (a) Bruno and Gay signed the "Agreement and Escrow" on 
behalf of the Appellees; and (b) the purchasers' obligation under 
the "Agreement and Escrow" is subject to an unfulfilled condition 
precedent, summary judgment is still proper as there can be no 
dispute that the Amendment to the "Agreement and Escrow" allowed 
the purchasers to cease the pursuit of Larson Ford's plan of 
reorganization. The first paragraph of the Amendment states: 
"It is agreed that the stock and voting rights 
will be reconveyed to Walter P. Larson in the 
event the purchasers cease active pursuit of 
the plan of reorganization of Larson Ford. 
Inc. (emphasis added)". 
As it is undisputed that the Addendum to the "Agreement and 
Escrow" gave the purchasers the absolute right to no longer pursue 
the purchase of Larson Ford, the Appellants cannot create a factual 
dispute by claiming that by way of affidavit the Appellees breached 
the contract by failing to comply with the terms of the "Agreement 
and Escrow". 
POINT II; THERE IS NO GENUINE DISPUTE THAT THE APPELLEES DID 
NOT MAKE CARELESS AND/OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
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The Appellants' Second Cause of Action alleged that the 
Appellees, acting through their agent Bruno and Gay, falsely 
represented: 
(a) that the Appellees would get releases from Citizen's 
Bank and CSB Bank; 
(b) that the Appellees would substitute collateral with 
the Small Business Administration; 
(c) that the Appellees would pay the outstanding sales 
tax; 
(d) that the Appellees would personally commit funds; 
and 
(e) that the Appellees would cooperate in the committing 
of ...financial resources. 
A. The Appellant's Claim of Negligent and/or Careless 
Misrepresentation Is Barred bv The Parol Evidence Rule. 
In the immediately preceding section, the Appellees have set 
forth the negligent and/or careless misrepresentations claimed by 
the Appellants. These "misrepresentations" are actually 
contractual obligations set forth in the "Addendum". Considering 
that Bruno and Gay signed the "Agreement and Escrow", Addendum and 
Amendment as purchasers and in their own capacity without any 
indication that they were signing the documents on behalf of anyone 
else, it is undisputed that Bruno and Gay obligated themselves 
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(and/or HBGH) and no one else. As was stated above, the parol 
evidence rule prevents the Appellants from introducing evidence 
that would vary or contradict the explicit terms of the written 
agreements, unless the evidence is consistent with or does not 
repudiate the terms of the written agreement. To claim that the 
Appellees were to perform certain acts when the written documents 
state that it was Bruno and Gay (and/or HBGH) who were to perform 
these acts is inconsistent with and repudiates an essential term of 
the contract. 
B, It Is Undisputed That Negligent Misrepresentation Cannot 
Apply In The Instant Case. 
In Ellis v. Hale. 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962) this Court held 
that: 
"Negligent misrepresentation differs from intentional 
representation in that in the former the representor 
makes an affirmative assertion which is false without 
having used reasonable diligence or competence in 
ascertaining the verity of the assertion. Moreover, 
liability will only lie for negligent misrepresentation 
when there is a special duty of care running from the 
representor to the representee." Id. at 385. 
In Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1979), the court 
set forth the limited circumstances in which the representor is 
held to a special duty of care: 
"If the circumstances are such that the defendant could 
exercise extraordinary influence over the plaintiff and 
the defendant was or should have been aware the plaintiff 
reposed trust and confidence in the defendant and 
reasonable relief on defendant's guidance, then the 
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parties are said to be *in confidential 
relationship'....There are few relationships (such as 
parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui) which the 
law presumes to be confidential." Id. at 302. 
The Appellants cite the case of Christensen v. Commonwealth 
Land Title Insurance, 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983) to set forth the 
elements of negligent misrepresentation. The Appellants fail to 
mention that in Christensen, just as in Ellis and Blodgett, the 
court held that unless there is a special duty of care, there 
cannot be negligent misrepresentation. The court quoted 1 F. 
Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts, § 7.6 at 546, for the 
proposition that such a special relationship and duty of care 
exists where the speaker is in the business of providing such 
information: 
"If, however, the information is given in the capacity of 
one in the business of supplying such information, that 
care and diligence should be exercised which is 
compatible with the particular business or profession 
involved. Those who deal with such persons do so because 
of the advantages which they expect to derive from this 
special competence. The law, therefore, may well 
predicate on such a relationship, the duty of care to 
insure the accuracy and validity of the information." 1 
F. Harper & F. James, supra, § 7.6 at 546. 
It is undisputed that in the instant case there was no such 
special duty of care or confidential relationship. The Appellants 
do no argue in their brief that negotiations between Bruno and Gay 
and the plaintiffs were anything but arms-length negotiations. The 
Affidavit of Walter Park Larson is devoid of any assertion that 
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there was a special duty of care or a confidential relationship. 
Even should this Court find that Bruno and Gay were the agents of 
the Appellees, the lower court properly dismissed the cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation as negligent 
misrepresentation does not apply to facts of the instant case. 
C. It Is Undisputed That The Appellees Did Not Misrepresent 
Facts to the Appellants. 
As was set forth above, the Appellants second cause of action 
claims that the Appellees made careless and/or negligent 
misrepresentations. On May 21, 1987 Appellant Walter P. Larson was 
deposed by the Appellees. Appellant Larson was asked numerous 
questions concerning the alleged false misrepresentations. 
Appellant Larson testified that (a) the alleged misrepresentations 
were the Appellees' "failure to perform on the basis of the 
agreement we'd drawn up..." (page 51, lines 17, 24; page 52, line 
4-7; page 53, lines 15-24; page 57, line 25; page 58, lines 3-5); 
(b) that misrepresentations were made by an individual who had no 
authority to bind the Appellees (page 53, lines 24, 15; page 54, 
lines 1-7) ; and (c) that the basis for the claim that the 
defendants knew their alleged misrepresentations were false when 
they were made was that Appellee Owen Hogle was not present during 
the "final negotiating..." (page 58, lines 18-22) and that "they 
didn't follow through with it" (page 58, lines 8, 9). 
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On February 16, 1988 Appellees served Appellants with 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. 
Interrogatory No. 6 asked the Appellants to state each and every 
fact that supported the Appellants' claim that the Appellees had 
made false misrepresentations. In response, the Appellants stated 
that an individual had made "claims and assurances that the 
defendants had wealth" and that other "contacts had stated that the 
defendants' name was "reliable and respected." On May 21, 1988 
Appellant Walter P. Larson was deposed. Consistent with the above-
mentioned answer to Interrogatories, the Appellant had testified 
that the misrepresentations were made by an individual named Steven 
Brown, and that Mr. Brown did not have the authority to bind the 
Appellees. Despite his answers to Interrogatories and his 
deposition testimony, the Appellants sought to forestall summary 
judgment by filing an affidavit in which they claimed that the 
Appellees, both personally and through their agents, made careless 
and/or negligent misrepresentations. 
In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), the Court 
stated: 
"...when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, 
that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not 
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit 
which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide 
an explanation of the discrepancy." Id. at 1173. 
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As the Affidavit of Walter P. Larson contradicts his 
deposition testimony as well as his signed and sworn Answers to 
Interrogatories, and as the Affidavit does not attempt to explain 
the discrepancies between his Affidavit and his previous testimony, 
it remains undisputed that the Appellees did not make careless 
and/or negligent misrepresentations to the Appellants. 
D. It Is Undisputed^ That Appellants Did Not Rely on 
Representations of the Appellees in Entering Into the 
"Agreement and Escrow". 
As was set forth in the preceding subsection, it is 
undisputed that the Appellees did not make any careless and/or 
negligent misrepresentations. In follows that if the Appellees did 
not make any representations, it is also undisputed that the 
Appellants could not have relied on any false misrepresentations 
made by the Appellees. Support for this position is found in 
Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624 (Utah 1960). In Dupler. the 
plaintiff had purchased the defendant's interest in oil wells. The 
plaintiff claimed that he had been induced to purchase these oil 
wells by the defendant's false representations. The Supreme Court 
of Utah affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. The court based its decision on the fact 
that the plaintiff, in agreeing to buy the defendant's oil 
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interests, had relied on representations made by individuals other 
than the defendants: 
"As a matter of law it is conceivable that a 
person might simultaneously rely on 
misrepresentations of divergent defendants. 
However, standing alone admissions by 
plaintiffs that they relied on others is 
sufficient proof to negative reliance on the 
present defendant." Id. at page 636. 
In the instant case, as in Dupler, as the Appellants' sworn 
testimony is that they relied on representations of others in 
entering into the agreement, it is undisputed that the Appellants 
did not rely on representations of the Appellees. 
POINT III: ON THE BASIS OF THE APPELLANT'S OWN DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY AND ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES. IT IS UNDISPUTED 
THAT APPELLEES WERE NOT PART OF THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD THE 
APPELLANTS. 
In the court below, the Appellees filed a total of four (4) 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The first Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment addressed the Appellants' claim of carelessly made and/or 
false misrepresentations. The lower court granted that motion and 
dismissed the cause of action for false misrepresentations. The 
Appellees then moved the lower court for summary judgment on the 
cause of action for breach of contract. The lower court granted 
that motion as well. After granting the Appellees7 second motion, 
the Appellants pled with the Court to allow the Appellants to 
pursue a cause of action that Appellants7 previous counsel had 
failed to pursue. The new theory was that the Appellees had 
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conspired with Stephen Wade to drive down the value of Larson Ford. 
The lower court allowed the Appellants to file an Amended Complaint 
to pursue this new theory. The new theory was presented in 
paragraph 56 of the Amended Complaint. The paragraph alleges that 
Appellants were involved in a scheme: 
"where a buyer would approach a seller and offer 
favorable terms which would be accepted by the seller. 
After depleting the seller's resources and limiting his 
ability to find other buyers, the original buyer would 
step back and allow for the distressed sale to another 
seconde [sic] buyer. The original buyer would profit 
through moneys paid by a second buyer or through the 
improper conversion of the seller's assets." 
Appellant Walter P. Larson's sworn deposition testimony shows 
that there is no genuine factual dispute that no such scheme 
existed. On page 10 of the deposition, Walter P. Larson was asked 
if he "had any evidence whatsoever that there was any collusion 
between Stephen Wade and the defendants..." After attempting to 
dodge the question and although Appellant Walter P. Larson did not 
recall when or by whom he was so informed, he did recall that he 
was told that: 
"Wades and the Hogles had been in contact with each other 
with the idea that was discussed being the fact that Wade 
had an inside track of some kind with Ford that they 
would be approved as the dealer, that if the Hogle group 
wanted to protect the investment that they'd made in the 
dealership to that point in time, in order to have the 
cooperation of the Wades, were - were they successful in 
getting a creditors' plan accepted, if the Hogle group 
wanted to get their money out that they would withdraw." 
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In short, the Appellants' entire evidence for the alleged 
scheme is a hearsay conversation in which the Appellees discussed 
with Stephen Wade the possibility of HBGH recovering through the 
bankruptcy court the money it had supplied to Larson Ford Sales. 
On January 28, 1992 the Appellees served the Appellants with 
a second set of Interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 4 stated: 
"Regarding your belief that the defendants were involved 
in a scheme in which the defendants planned to deplete 
plaintiff's resources after which another individual in 
collusion with the defendants would purchase plaintiff's 
assets at a greatly reduced price, please state (a) each 
and every fact upon which you base your belief; (b) the 
title, location and individual in possession of each 
document which supports your belief." 
The Appellants' lengthy answer to this Interrogatory is devoid 
of any admissible evidence that the Appellees were part of a scheme 
to defraud the Appellants. 
POINT IV; THE APPELLANTS INCORRECTLY ASSERT THAT THE LOWER 
COURT WAS UNABLE TO RULE DECISIVELY. 
On page 7 of their brief, the Appellants state that "The trial 
court in this case was unable to clearly resolve the issues 
presented to it and decisively rule." It is imagined that the 
Appellants make this statement in that it is easier to convince 
this Court that the lower court erred if the lower court was not 
certain as to whether there were genuine disputes. In making this 
assertion, the Appellants have completely mischaracterized the 
proceedings in the court below. On the 26th day of August, 1988, 
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ruling from the bench, the lower court granted the Appellees' first 
Motion for Summary Judgment and thereby dismissed the cause of 
action for carelessly and/or negligently made misrepresentations. 
On October 7, 1988 the lower court, ruling from the bench, granted 
the Appellees' second Motion for Summary Judgment and thereby 
dismissed the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. As is 
set forth in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 7, 1992 (Addendum A), 
following the court's granting of the second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Appellants pled with the court to allow the 
Appellants to pursue a theory that the Appellants' previous counsel 
had failed to advance. That cause of action was that the Appellees 
had been part of a scheme to deplete Larson Ford's assets after 
which the co-conspirator would purchase Larson Ford at a greatly 
reduced price. The court did allow the Appellants to file an 
amended complaint to explore this new cause of action. The 
complaint filed by the Appellants contained the new cause of action 
as well as the two old causes of action which had been previously 
dismissed. On July 6, 1989 the Appellees filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. On November 20, 1989, after having taken the 
matter under advisement, the court denied the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. As is set forth in paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact, 
the reason the court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment was 
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none other than "the Court was of the opinion that at the time the 
defendant had brought the motion, the plaintiff had not had 
sufficient time to pursue the matters set forth in the Amended 
Complaint." On May 5, 1992, after having received the Appellants' 
answers to Appellees' Interrogatories dated January 28, 1992, the 
Appellees filed the Motion for Summary Judgment that is the subject 
of this Court's review. The procedural history demonstrates that 
not only did the lower court rule decisively, but in allowing the 
Appellants to amend their complaint to pursue the new theory after 
the court had granted summary judgment, and in denying the 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 17, 1989 so as to 
allow the Appellants sufficient time to develop the allegations of 
fraud, it is undisputed that the lower court allowed the Appellants 
every opportunity to present a factual dispute, something the 
Appellants have been unable to do. 
POINT V: THE APPELLEES HAVE NOT MADE THE ADMISSIONS 
ATTRIBUTED TO THEM BY THE APPELLANTS. 
On page 13 of their brief, the Appellants claim that: 
"Appellees have admitted that they met with 
Appellants for the purpose of extending the 
time within which conditions contained in the 
Earnest Money Agreement had to be satisfied" 
and that 
"Appellees further admitted that Owen Hogle 
filed personal financial statements with the 
United States Bankruptcy Court indicating that 
he intended to purchase Larson Ford." 
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Attached hereto as Addendum N are the Appellees' Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Request for Admissions to Defendants James 
Hogle, Jr. and Owen Hogle, and the Amended Answer to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Request for Admissions to Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen Hogle. In answering Admission No. 7, the Appellees denied 
that they met with the Appellants to extend the time in which 
conditions contained in the Earnest Money Agreement had to be 
satisfied. In answering Admission No. 12, the Appellees denied 
that Owen Hogle had filed personal financial statements with the 
United States Bankruptcy Court indicating that he intended to 
purchase Larson Ford. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
lower court's granting of the Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment as based on the written documents, the Appellants' 
deposition testimony, Answers to Interrogatories and the Affidavit 
of Appellee Owen C. Hogle, there are no genuine factual issues 
disputing that: 
(a) Appellees James and Owen C. Hogle were not parties 
to the written documents; 
(b) The contractual obligations of the purchasers 
(whomever they are) are subject to an unfulfilled condition 
precedent; 
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(c) The purchasers (whomever they are) had the absolute 
right to no longer pursue the purchase of Larson Ford; 
(d) The cause of action for carelessly and/or 
negligently made false representations is barred by the parol 
evidence rule; 
(e) There is no confidential relationship between the 
Appellants and the Appellees; 
(f) The Appellants did not rely on any statements of the 
Appellees; and 
(g) At time was there any collusion between the 
Appellees and any other individual to deplete the assets of Larson 
Ford. 
DATED this 3/<s day of /fj&fC/Qr'Y , 1993. 
McKAY# BURTON & THURMAN 
By: 
Harry /Caston 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr, 
and Owen C. Hogle 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
By. 
Third Judicial DirArict 
JUL-7 1992 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy vJierk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, 
SYBIL LARSON and 
JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and 
Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR,, and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al., 
Defendants and 
Counter-Claimants« 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
On the 12th day of June, 1992 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. came on 
to be heard defendant James and Owen Hogle's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding. The 
plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of record, John J. 
Borsos and Hans M. Scheffler. Defendants, James and Owen Hogle, 
were represented by their counsel of record, Harry Caston. The 
Court having read the pleadings submitted by the parties, having 
reviewed the file and having heard oral argument, now makes the 
following 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed in June of 1984 
contained two causes of action, a cause of action for breach of the 
contract known as the Agreement and Escrow, and a cause of action 
for "carelessly and/or negligently made false misrepresentations". 
2. Defendants James and Owen Hogle moved the Court for 
partial summary judgment on the cause of action for carelessly 
and/or negligently made false misrepresentations. The Court 
granted the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as 
there were no genuine issues as to any of the material facts: 
(a) that Defendants James and Owen Hogle made any 
representations to the plaintiffs; 
(b) there were any representations made to the plaintiff 
of a then presently existing material fact; 
(c) the plaintiffs did not rely on representations of 
the Hogles; 
(d) that if anything, the plaintiffs relied on 
representations made by others who were not agents or authorized to 
speak on behalf of the Hogles; 
(e) that the Hogles did not act>knowingly or recklessly. 
3. The Hogles then moved the Court for summary judgment on 
the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. The Court 
granted the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as the Court 
found that there were no genuine issues as to the following 
material facts: 
3 
(a) the Hogles were not parties to any of the agreements 
with the plaintiff and/or Larson Ford; 
(b) the Agreement and Escrow and Addendum allowed the 
purchasers to cease efforts to purchase Larson Ford; 
(c) the purchasers' obligation under the Agreement and 
Escrow was contingent upon a condition precedent which was 
unfulfilled. 
4. The plaintiff then claimed that there was a new theory 
that plaintiffs7 previous counsel had failed to advance. This new 
theory was that the Hogles were part of a scheme to defraud the 
plaintiff. This theory held that the Hogles conspired with Stephen 
Wade. The plan was that the Hogles would deplete the plaintiffs7 
business assets which would then allow Stephen Wade to purchase the 
assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced price. 
5. The Court granted the plaintiffs7 Motion to File an 
Amended Complaint to allow the plaintiffs to pursue this new 
theory. 
6. The plaintiffs7 Amended Complaint (which should properly 
be denominated Second Amended Complaint) contains three causes of 
action. The first two causes of action are the same as were 
contained in the original Complaint and the plaintiffs7 First 
Amended Complaint. These causes of action are breach of the 
contract dated March 5, 1983, and negligent misrepresentation. The 
third cause of action alleges fraud. This new cause of action is 
where the plaintiff alleges that the Hogles acted in collusion with 
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Stephen Wade to deplete Larson Ford's assets which would then allow 
Wade to purchase the entity at a reduced price. 
7. That following the plaintiff's filing the Amended 
Complaint, the defendant again moved the Court for summary 
judgment. The Court did not grant the defendant's motion as the 
Court was of the opinion that at the time the defendant had brought 
the motion, the plaintiff had not had sufficient time in which to 
pursue the matters set forth in the Amended Complaint. The 
defendants subsequently filed the Motion for Summary Judgment that 
is now before the Court. 
8. That the plaintiffs have failed to present any new 
evidence by way of affidavit or documentation which would raise a 
genuine issue to any of the material facts raised in Defendant 
Hogles' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the causes of action 
for breach of contract and negligently and/or carelessly made false 
misrepresentations. 
9. The plaintiff's new cause of action alleges that 
Defendants James and Owen Hogle acted fraudulently and that they 
joined forces with Stephen Wade to deplete the assets of Larson 
Ford. Particularly, the plaintiffs claim that the Hogles never 
intended to purchase the assets of Larson Ford, that the Hogles 
undertook to manage Larson Ford in a slipshod manner and then 
withdraw which would allow Stephen Wade to purchase the assets of 
Larson Ford at a reduced price. 
10. That the defendants took the deposition of plaintiff Park 
Larson. The plaintiff was asked to explain the factual basis of 
5 
his claim of fraud against the Hogles. The plaintiff's answer to 
the deposition question does not in any way raise a factual dispute 
that the Hogles fraudulently schemed to deplete the assets of 
Larson Ford so as to allow Stephen Wade to purchase the dealership. 
11. The plaintiff was asked by the defendant through 
interrogatories to identify the factual basis of his claim that the 
Hogles had acted fraudulently. The plaintiff's answer to this 
interrogatory as well as to the deposition question does not in any 
way raise the factual dispute that the Hogles fraudulently schemed 
to deplete the assets of Larson Ford to allow Stephen Wade to 
purchase the dealership. 
12. The Court also finds that there is no genuine factual 
dispute that the Hogles fraudulently entered into a contract with 
the plaintiffs in that: 
(a) that the Hogles did not enter into any agreement 
with the plaintiff; and 
(b) that the parties to the Agreement and Escrow had a 
right to cease pursuit of the purchase of Larson Ford. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As there are no genuine issues as to any of the material facts 
raised in the plaintiff's Complaint, it is just and proper that the 
Court grant Defendant James and Owen Hogle's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
DATED this 
n 
day of 
(/ BY THJ^COURT:
 y /V"^' * V \ 
DISTRICT JUDGE ' ' ^ ^ J 
Approved as to form: 
John J. Borsos, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Hans M. Scheffler, Esq, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
eliz\harry\hogle6.fof 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on theJ3P/fc/day of June, 1992, true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
John J. Borsos 
370 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hans M. Scheffler 
311 South State, #380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
eliz\harry\hogle6.fof 
ADDENDUM B 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen C. Hogle 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
Third Judicial P'^rict 
J U L - 7 1992 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By-
Dbputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, 
SYBIL LARSON and 
JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and 
Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al., 
Defendants and 
Counter-Claimants« 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
On the 12th day of June, 1992 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. came on 
to be heard Defendants James and Owen C. Hogle's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of 
record, John J. Borsos and Hans M. Scheffler. Defendants James and 
Owen C. Hogle were represented by their counsel of record, Harry 
Caston. The Court having heard the arguments of the parties, 
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That Defendants James and Owen'C. Hogle's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be granted. 
DATED this ~~] day of A ^
 
, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
John J. Borsos, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Hans M. Scheffler, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
J-A— 
RICHARD U. MOFFAT 
DISTRICT/COURT JUDGE 
e l i z \ h a r r y \ h o g l e 6 . o r d 
3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the X ' day of June, 1992, true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary 
Judgment were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
John J. Borsos 
370 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hans M. Scheffler 
311 South State, #380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
jh) yu^ 
eliz\harry\hogle6.ord 
ADDENDUM C 
9/** 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN (3267) 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen C. Hogle 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON 
and JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Counter-
Defendants. 
vs 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al., 
Defendants and Counter-
Claimants . 
DEFENDANTS* OWEN AND JAMES 
HOGLE'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint that 
the defendants have breached the contract known as the 
"Agreement and Escrow," a copy of which is attached hereto and 
hereby made Exhibit "A". 
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2. The Agreement and Escrow was entered into on March 
5, 1983, between plaintiff, Walter P. Larson, Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. and HBGH, an intended corporation. 
3. Defendants Stephen Bruno and Dennis W. Gay signed 
the Agreement and Escrow for HBGH, an intended corporation. 
4. The Agreement and Escrow incorporated an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum of February 4, 
1983, all of which are attached hereto and are hereby made 
Exhibits "B" and "C". The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase and Addendum were agreements between defendants Bruno, 
Gay and/or their assigns and Walter P. Larson. 
5. That concurrently with the execution of the Agree-
ment and Escrow, defendants Bruno and Gay entered into an 
Amendment (a copy of which is attached hereto and hereby made 
Exhibit "D") with Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
Paragraph 1 of the Amendment states that: "It is agreed that 
the stock voting rights will be reconveyed to Walter P. Larson 
in the event the purchasers cease active pursuit of the Plan of 
Reorganization of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. (emphasis added) 
6. That prior to entering into the Agreement and 
Escrow, Larson Ford Sales had filed for relief pursuant to 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
- 3 -
7. Pursuant to Section 1121 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, Larson Ford Sales had a 120-day exclusive 
period in which to file a Plan of Reorganization. 
8. That pursuant to Section 1123 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Co4e, after the expiration of the 120-day period in 
which Larson Ford Sales had an exclusive right to file a Plan of 
Reorganization, any interested party could file a Plan of 
Reorganization. 
9. That the defendants' obligation under the Agreement 
and Escrow was "contingent on the Bankruptcy Court's approval of 
a Plan of Reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc." 
10. The Bankruptcy Court did not approve the Plan of 
Reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
11. The Bankruptcy Court did approve the second Plan of 
Reorganization submitted by Stephen Wade. 
12. That from March 21, 1983, HBGK supplied in excess 
of $150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales. 
13. Plaintiffs' claim in paragraph 3 of the Amended 
Complaint that the defendants had the obligation to "take such 
steps as to submit a satisfactory plan to the Bankruptcy Court 
as required in the contract." 
14. The Agreement and Escrow does not obligate the 
defendants to take such steps as to submit a satisfactory plan 
to the Bankruptcy Court. 
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15. Plaintiff Sybil Larson was never a party to any of 
the aforementioned agreements. 
16. Defendants James and Owen Hogle were not obligated 
by or parties to any of the aforementioned documents. 
17. That defendants James and Owen Hogle were not and 
have never been officers, directors or shareholders or HBGH. 
18. Plaintiffs were aware that HBGH was to become a 
corporation and dealt with HBGH as a corporation (deposition of 
Sybil Larson, page 11, line 8). 
19. HBGH became a corporation on March 22, 1983. 
20. The Hogles were never the assigns of Bruno and Gay. j 
POINT I I 
THE HOGLES DID NOT ENTER INTO A CONTRACT WITH THE PLAINTIFFS I 
The First Cause of Action of Plaintiffs1 Amended Com-
plaint alleges that the defendants breached a contract of March j 
i 
i 
5, 1983. There can be no argument that it is impossible for a | 
person to breach a contract to which he is not a party. James ' 
and Owen Hogle were not parties to the contract of March 5, j 
1983. The contract (otherwise referred to as the "Agreement and ! 
Escrow") is between HBGH, Inc, as purchaser and Walter Park I 
Larson as seller. Defendants Stephen Bruno and Dennis Gay 
Signed the agreement on behalf of HBGH. At the time the agree-
ment was signed, HBGH was not a corporation. However, HBGH was 
incorporated on March 22, 1988. As Sybil Larson stated in her 
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deposition, the plaintiffs were aware HBGH was to become a 
corporation. 
The Agreement of March 5, 1983, incorporated an Earnest j 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum dated February I 
4, 1983. The Hogles are not parties to either of those docu-
ments. The parties to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to j 
t 
i 
Purchase were Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis W. Gay and/or assigns ; 
and Walter P. Larson. The parties to the Addendum are Walter P. J 
i 
Larson for Larson Ford Sales and defendant Stephen P. Bruno. • 
i 
The Hogles were never the assigns of Bruno, Gay or HBGH. j 
I 
There was an amendment to the Agreement of March 5, j 
1983. That amendment was between Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis j 
Gay as buyers and Walter P. Larson and Walter P. Larson, presi- I 
« 
dent of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. ; 
! 
Plaintiffs suggest that even though the Hogles did not , 
sign any agreements with the plaintiffs, the Hogles are liable 
for the alleged breach of contract for two reasons. The first 
reason is that agents of the Hogles represented to the plain-
tiffs that the Hogles were in fact parties to the contract. The , 
second argument is that because HBGH was never a corporation, ! 
i 
i 
the Hogles were partners in HBGH. Neither of these theories are ! 
valid. I The parol evidence rule as set forth in FMA Financial 
Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), 
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prevents the plaintiffs in this case from introducing any 
evidence which would contradict or vary the terms of the parties 
written agreements• There is one caveat to the parol evidence 
rule. A party may introduce evidence that is collateral to the 
written agreement. The collateral evidence may not be inconsis-
tent with the written agreement. The collateral evidence may 
not repudiate the terms of the written agreement. 
To reiterate, plaintiffs claim that the Hogles are 
actually parties to the March 5, 1983 Agreement by virtue of 
representations made to the plaintiffs by agents of the Hogles. 
This assertion certainly contradicts and varies the terms of the 
written agreement. The plaintiffs may not make use of the 
caveat to the parol evidence rule. The Agreement of March 5, 
1983 (or any other documentation for that matter) is void of 
even the slightest indication that the Hogles were parties to 
the contract. To claim otherwise is inconsistent and varies an 
essential term of the March 5, 1983 Agreement. 
It is significant that the parties who signed the 
Agreement and Escrow and other documents did specify the 
capacity in which they were signing each document. On numerous 
documents, plaintiff Walter P. Larson signed for himself and for 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. Defendants Gay and Bruno signed on 
their behalf and on behalf of HBGH. No one ever signed any 
agreement on behalf of the Hogles. 
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Plaintiffs1 second claim, that the Hogles are liable by 
virtue of the fact that the Hogles were partners in HBGH as HBGH 
never incorporated is absurd. HBGH was a corporation. The 
Certificate of Incorporation attached hereto and hereby made 
Exhibit "E" proves that fact. HBGH was a corporation during the 
time it paid $150,000.00 to cover the operating expenses of 
Larson Ford, Inc. 
POINT II 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE SUBJECT TO AN 
UNFULFILLED CONDITION PRECEDENT 
There are instances when an individual's contractual 
obligations do not arise until a condition precedent has been 
satisfied. An example is the case of Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 
149 (Utah 1978). In Creer the plaintiff entered into an agree-
ment with the defendant to purchase a parcel of real estate. 
The court found that the plaintiff knew that there was a pos-
sibility that the defendant's ability to convey title was based 
on a contingency. The contingency did not occur and the defen-
dant was unable to convey title. The court, in holding that the 
defendant's contractual obligation had not arisen, stated: 
"Whether a provision in a contract is a 
condition, the non-fulfillment of which excuses 
performance, depends upon the intent of the 
parties, to be ascertained from a fair and 
reasonable construction of the language used in 
light of all the circumstances when they execut-
ed the contract." Id. at 51. 
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Defendants James and Owen Hogle vigorously cling to the 
argument stated above, that the Hogles were not parties to the 
contract that is the subject of this action. Assuming for the 
sake of argument, the court finds that the Hogles were parties 
to the contract; the Hogles and the other defendants cannot be 
liable for a breach of contract as the defendant's contractual 
obligations were subject to a condition precedent. That condi-
tion precedent was never satisfied. Prior to the Agreement of 
March 5, 1983, Larson Ford Sales had filed for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiffs 
had, in accordance with Section 1121 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, 120 days from the date they filed for relief in 
which to file their own bankruptcy plan. 
Pursuant to paragraphs E and F of the March 5, 1983 
Agreement and Escrow, the closing date of the agreement was to 
be within ten days from the date the Bankruptcy Court confirmed 
the Plan of Reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales. If 
the Bankruptcy Court did not approve the plan of Larson Ford 
Sales, the defendants had the right to "rescind the purchase 
Agreement and Escrow.11 The Bankruptcy Court did not approve the 
plan submitted by Larson Ford. 
Once the 120-day period in which the debtor has an 
exclusive right to file a bankruptcy plan has expired, any other 
party in interest may file a bankruptcy plan. Once the 
- 9 -
bankruptcy court approves a plan of an interested party, the 
debtor can no longer file his own plan. In the instant case, 
Stephen Wade, as a party in interest, submitted a bankruptcy 
plan. Wade's first plan was rejected. Wade submitted a second 
plan which was then approved by the Bankruptcy Court. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT BREACH THE AGREEMENT OF MARCH 5, 1983 
In paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs 
claim that the defendants breached the contract by failing to 
deliver any consideration that was called for in the agreement 
and failing to submit a satisfactory plan to the Bankruptcy 
Court as required in the contract. The first problem with this 
allegation is that a review of the contract reveals that the 
defendants did not have an obligation to submit a satisfactory 
plan to the Bankruptcy Court. In fact, the Amendment to the 
Agreement and Escrow gave the defendants the right to cease 
active pursuit of the Plan of Reorganization. The second 
problem with this allegation is that HBGH supplied over 
$150,000.00 from March 21, 1983, through June, 1983 to Larson 
Ford Sales. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS OWEN AND JAMES HOGLE ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEE INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS ACTION 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 1953 as amended, the court may impose a sanction including 
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reasonable expenses and a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in 
the defense of a pleading that is not well grounded in fact, 
warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument. There can 
be no question that plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint offends the 
standard of Rule 11. Plaintiffs1 link to defendants Owen and 
James Hogle is the assertion that HBGH was never a corporation. 
A ninety-second telephone call to the Department of Business 
Regulations would have informed plaintiffs that HBGH was in fact 
a corporation. In paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint, plain-
tiffs assert that the defendants entered into the contract 
individually and as partners of HBGH. As has been discussed 
above, this assertion is false. Defendants Gay and Bruno 
entered into contracts with the plaintiff Walter Larson. As if 
these falsehoods were not sufficient, in paragraph 3 of the 
Amended Complaint the plaintiffs assert that the defendants 
failed to deliver consideration and to take the necessary steps 
to submit a satisfactory bankruptcy plan. As was stated above, 
these allegations have no correlation to the truth. HBGH 
supplied $150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales. It is odd that 
plaintiffs contend that the defendants had an obligation to 
submit a bankruptcy plan when in fact the amendment to the 
Agreement and Escrow allows the defendants to unequivocally 
cease active pursuit of such a plan. 
- 1 1 - I 
POINT V I 
PLAINTIFF SYBIL LARSON WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT 
OF MARCH 5, 1983 I 
Should the court not grant defendantsf Motion for 
Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs1 First Cause of Action, J 
plaintiff Sybil Larson should be removed as a plaintiff as Sybil j 
Larson was not a party to the Agreement of March 5, 1983. 
CONCLUSION I 
Defendants James and Owen Hogle are entitled to summary j 
judgment on plaintiffs' First Cause of Action as there are no j 
genuine disputes as to any of the material facts. The undisput-
ed fact is that Owen and James Hogle were not parties to the | 
contract that is the subject matter of this lawsuit. Similarly, j 
Sybil Larson was not a party to the contract that is the subject j 
matter of this lawsuit. The Hogles were not hidden principals. 
They were not the assigns of defendants Bruno and Gay. The j 
plaintiffs entered into a contract with certain individuals. j 
The Hogles are not these individuals. Any evidence to the I 
contract is prohibited by the parol evidence rule. j 
There is no genuine dispute that the plaintiffs were I 
negotiating with defendants Bruno and Gay individually and with | 
Bruno and Gay as representatives of HBGH. The plaintiffs knew 
all along that HBGH was to become a corporation. HBGH did in j 
fact incorporate on March 22, 1983. 
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There can be no factual dispute that the obligation of 
the parties to the March 5, 1983 contract could not arise until 
the Bankruptcy Court had approved the Larson Ford Sales Plan of 
Reorganization. The Bankruptcy Court did not approve Larson's 
plan. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument, that the Hogles 
were parties to the contract, the fact that Larson's plan was 
never approved by the Bankruptcy Court prevents any obligation 
the Hogles may have had from arising. 
Assuming once again for the sake of argument, that not 
only were the Hogles parties to the March 5, 1983, contract, but 
also that the Hogles obligation to perform under the contract 
had arisen, the Hogles would still be entitled to summary 
judgment. That is because there is no genuine debate that the 
Hogles did not breach the contract. The alleged breaches in the 
contract are a failure to deliver consideration and failure of 
the defendants to take the necessary steps to submit a satisfac-
tory plan to the Bankruptcy Court. The undisputed evidence is 
that HBGH did supply $150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales. Further 
the defendants could not have breached the contract by failing 
to take such steps as necessary to submit a satisfactory plan to 
the Bankruptcy Court as the defendants were not required to do 
so. 
Defendants James and Owen Hogle are entitled to sanc-
tions against the plaintiffs as the allegations in their Amended 
Complaint are completely at odds with the undisputed evidence. 
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Dated this day of September, 1988. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
By 
William Thomas Thurman 
Harry Caston 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Owen and James Hogle 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the day 
of September, 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
JOHN J. BORSOS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
807 East South Temple, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Mr. Dennis W. Gay 
780 West 889 South 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Stanley Adams, Esq. 
Attorney for Stephen P. Bruno 
521 Sixth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Dated this day of September, 1988. 
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EXHIBIT /w .-JH dj.' EXHIBIT 2 
FOR m*-" 5V/-f7 17-4) 
PAUUTTE fOTH£R«JpWkM,Wt CSR. RPR 
AGREEMENT AND ESCROW WITNESS "j?C T^MjilU 
AN AGREEMENT dated this *T <**y of Ksrch, 1983, by snd 
between ttBCH, INC, (an intended corporation) hereinafter referred 
to as "Purchasers" sad WALTER PARK LARSON, hereinafter referred 
to MM nS*UMr"* 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of all of the issued and outstanding 
coaraon shares of Larson Ford Sales, a Delaware corporation, and 
further represents that he is authorised to represent any parties 
claiming MA interest in said stock for the purpose of carrying out 
the objectives of this Agreement. 
2* Larson Ford Sales has filed a petition for relief under 
Chapter U of the Bankruptcy Act which is presently pending before 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah* 
Seller Is an officer end director of Larson Ford Sales 
end is^puchorized to execute this Agreement on behalf of Larson 
Ford Sales Insofar as this Agreement effects the implementation 
of the debtor1 s plan of reorganisation and the day-to-day opera-
tion of the business of Larson.Ford Sales* 
4« Purchasers, desire to purchase ell of the issued and 
outstanding ehates of Larson Ford Sales and desl?% further to^  
*MBM**-the ially operations of Larson FortrSeles, including dl~. 
*^fcLa^t^^jlQrmula£toa of the "plan of reorganisation, for Larson 
_Foard\54Xe* 
5. The parties desire to establish an escrow account with 
Harold R. Stephens, Attorney at Law, 320 -South 300 East, Salt Lake 
City9 Utah, 84111. telephone (801) 328-0645, to act as the escrow 
agent to carry out the terms and conditions of the escrow. 
IN CONSIDERATION OF the mutual promises contained herein, 
the parties agree as follows: 
A. Seller agrees to sell to Purchasers ?$Z of his sharts 
of the common stock of Larson Ford Sales together with all of the 
remaining issued and outstanding shares of Larson Ford Sales. 
Seller shall deliver all of said shares9 properly endorsed and 
assigned, to the escrow agent within 5 days from the execution 
of this Agreement, together with proper assignment of voting rights. 
-~--~ae » r : : ^ a^rse :r.ac :r.a : i=e for - los ing of this 
%
*itail 3* «!=:«.» :2a oays iron : I « ' M C 2 O£ confirmation 
iarsoo Joru Sal 2s p^an 3: rsoruamzation 3y ::ie ^anxrustzy 
Jurchaaera anau.- .lave :r.e ri^nt to rascina :he purchase 
md lacrsv i s trie *vent :aat :ne Laroon Fore Saies pion 
Sg' !=S^J^-Blisicioa i s aot aoproved by cae Sanxruotcy Court. Upon 
of C:M3 I V « C , :r.e Purchasers have :he n z n c :o 
A^raeoent- l a taat event :ae escrow a^snc is d irsc t sd 
8fc»-.»£=?2 £h* auoinct casn :o cr.e Purcnasero ana :n« 3 u o l e c : snares 
^5^**1 i! 
fipssssu 
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* » **T3* to do a i l th ia ip aacasaary to aaaacaia zz± Ford >Sotcr 
-£—f^aj franchise, l a continual forca and a i i a c t u n t i l auch t^ae 
| i i ±z *ay be tranafarrad, 
V""- !• ^ e parrias acknowledge that tada Agraeacnt ia scant co 
^ *oo_y aiHci ,ag upon the p a r t i e s and that subsequent to the execution 
+i other 4 ? r a « t a , the p a r t i e s agree to cocperaca -ful ly i n execu-
'JT 3 ^ ^«a^er .<rta«r agraeaenca and dccusaenta ara necessary to f u l l y 
iarae 'and cocdiricaa of thia agrsenenc. ' 
I." .-\^"
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•Zacrov A^entt Harold 
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LARSON FORD -SALES, INC. 
BY: /kJ&eZ^ &Zl*-o^ 
ITS: , ^ ^ * 7 ' 
Walter Park Larson, Sailer 
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WITNESS N rJlhmrrU 
^HXSijIS s^^ .ADDSSfDCIi TO thet. certain Earnest Money :eiptuand Offer to Purchase dated 
Ifebru&i
 t 1983 viarein Stephen P. Bruno, Dennis . Cay and/or assigns appear as 
purchasers of th>#business at 5500 South State Street , Hurray, Utah, known as Larson 
.the ^oSa^pV&chase price to be $175,000.00 to be paid in the form of cash notes or 
ireaX. es tate deeced acceptable to theSel ler . 
ls& •'" • • ^ '^;*V 
£urch£ser #£rees to purchase all assets of Larson Pord, including property lease, 
j«tock in the/,corporation, all parts, furniture, fixtures, signs, accessories, equip-
''aiasxt and air other items used in the operation of Larson Ford, together with all 
[liabilities of the business. 
jfgj&P ,*$;••* .tojfurjxish the Purchaaer with a liat of all Laraon Pord Assets. Seller 
£P**a•Vq*,/urnistiL,!'the Purchaaer with a list of all Larson Ford's personal property. 
frhe assets^and peraonal property should include but not be limited to: signs, furni-
ture, -fixture*, apparatus, equipsont, machinery, tools, leasehold improvements, cars, 
^accessories* parts and appliances ZT.* replacements thereto, if any, owned by Larson 
•frofd esd located on or attached to the premises or used in connection with the operation 
fof the premises. 
Seller agrees to cake available to Purchaser's agent, at Larson Ford's place of buaines*. 
all books, recotds and other personal documents. 
< . 
purchaser agrees to sign over to Seller all right, title, liability and all ircerest 
in the fire insurance claim currently in dispute. 
Purchaser sgrees to negotiate suVtitute collateral to actcr.plish release of Larson's 
personal liability to Citiz2ns i;-.r.x, 2ions Firjt K-.ti.2raI Sr.r.x, Commercial Se(urity 
Bank, Small Business Administration, and State Tax Comission. 
Purchaser understands that there is an immediate cash flow problem at the business, 
asd upon removal of all ether contingencies, •'.11 b'j willing Co influx needed capital 
into the business to keep it functioning during the escrow period. 
Seller represents thet the total monies due to all creditors exclusive of any interest o 
sales tax or S3A, is no more than $2,100,000.00. In the event that the total monies 
due to all creditors is more than $2,100*000.00, the amount over $2,100,000.00 shall 
be deducted from the purchase price and downpayment respectively. 
Seller agrees to execute a "Non-Competition Agreement" agreeing not to have an owner-
ship interest in a Ford dealership within a radius of fiva (5) miles from Larson Ford 
for a period of five years, carrying with it a penalty of $500,000.00 if Seller is 
found in violation of the Agreement. 
Purchaser agrees to honor an agreement with Salt Lake School District for "loaner" 
cars* 
Purchaser agrees: to furnish the Sellers with two (2) demos through August, 1983, 
at no cost. 
/This offer subject tc approval of Purchaser's and Seller's attorneys of final Buy-Sell 
I Agreement, and appiwwl of the Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
Purchaser agrees to allow the Seller to purchase cars or trucks for Seller's personal 
use at Invoice price. 
This offer subject to and contingent upon the following: 
1. Approval of Ford Motor Corporstion of franchise transfer or acceptable solution 
to the franchise 
2. Purchaser's inspection and approval 'jf property lease, such approval to be in writing 
3. Purchaser's inspection and approval of the list of the assets and the list of 
personal property, such approval a.v- acceptance to be in writing 
A. Purchaser accepting and approving the findings of his agent after the inspection 
of the books, records and other personal documents. Such approval and ^ ^ c a n c ^ 
shall be in writing. ^X'j2(/ll* 
All contingencies shall be remevad in writing by noon, Tuesday. February^£V9S3(£^ 
Buy*r agrees to ?*•; to Wcrdley Corporation a finder's fee of $75,000.00 to be pa& 
s- closing. Closing sh-iii be on or before March 15, i^ 3* 
.- w_J^<7 . r ^ — v T ^ ^*" Date: 
Pete: '+-( f I dJ> _ <..•,-* ,~~~ ^ Se l lers 
/^cssc///?M-^t's Cz-y?s*? y?c y/js-sL.- yZ-y* res' 
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(§iiice oi the ^ieutexmnt (Ba'aevnov 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
HBGH, INC. 
I. DAVID S. MONSON, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF UTAH,HERESY CERTIFY 
THAT DUPLICATE ORIGINALS OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION FOR THE INCORPORATION OF 
HBGH, INC. 
DULY SIGNED AND VERIFIED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF THE UTAH BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT, HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN MY OFFICE AND ARE FOUND TO CONFORM 
TO LAW. 
ACCORDINGLY, BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I HEREBY 
ISSUE THIS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF 
HBGH, INC. 
AND ATTACH HERETO A DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION. 
102e79. 
'HI 
>+*»**** 
IN TESTIMONY WEREOF, I have hereunto 
set my hand and affixed the Great Seal of the 
State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, this .?.?. day 
0f MARCH _. f 19 83 
UELTENANT GOVERNOR 
ADDENDUM D 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN (3267) 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen C. Hogle 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON 
and JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Counter-
Defendants . 
vs 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al., 
Defendants and Counter-
Claimants. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS HOGLES' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
FACTS 
1. On or about July 1, 1983, plaintiffs filed their 
complaint. 
2. The complaint contained two causes of action. The 
second cause of action sought relief based on "carelessly and/or 
negligently made false representations made by the defendants." 
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3. Defendants brought a motion to dismiss the second 
cause of action or in the alternative, a motion for a more 
definite statement as the plaintiffs had failed to properly 
plead the elements of fraud as is required by Rule 9B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. On May 29, 1984, this Court granted defendants1 
motion for a more definite statement and allowed the plaintiffs 
10 days to amend their complaint. 
5. Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint within the 
time provided by the Court. 
6. That paragraph 9 of the plaintiffs1 amended com-
plaint alleges that "defendants carelessly and/or negligently 
made false representations that they could and would perform the 
conditions described in the agreements between the parties." 
7. On May 21, 1987, defendant Hogle took the deposi-
tion of plaintiff Walter P. Larson. Plaintiff was asked numer-
ous questions concerning the defendants1 alleged false misrep-
resentations. The plaintiff testified that (a) t-h<? ^ n^gp.H ^ 
misrepresentations were the defendants1 "failure to perform on 
the basis of the agreement we'd drawn up . . . " (Page~~5l, line 
17, 24; Page 52, lines 4-7; Page 53, lines 15-24; Page 57, line 
25; Page 58, lines 3-5); (b) that misrepresentations were made 
by an individual who had no authority to bind the HogTesT—'(Page 
53, line 24, 25; Page 54, lines 1-7); (c) tliat the basis for its 
- 3 -
claim that the defendants knew their alleged misrepresentations 
M 
\fl 
were false when they were made was that defendant Owen Hogle was 
not present during the "final negotiating. . . ." (Page 58, 
lines 18-22) and that "they didn't follow through with it" (Page 
58, lines 8 and 9). 
Plaintiff did not have with him at the time of the 
^position any documentary evidence which would support his 
claim that the defendants knew the alleged misrepresentations 
were false when made, but he would supply such evidence to 
defendants1 counsel (Page 61, lines 8 and 25; Page 62, lines 
1-3). 
9. Defendants have never received any documentary 
evidence from plaintiffs regarding plaintiffs' claims that the 
defendants knew the alleged misrepresentations were false when 
made. 
10. On February 16, 1988 defendants served upon plain-
tiffs Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, 
a copy of which is attached hereto and made Exhibit "A". 
11. Interrogatory No. 6 of defendants' Interrogatories 
asks the plaintiffs to state each and every fact which supports 
plaintiffs' claim that defendants made fraudulent misrepresen-
tations and to identify and produce each and every document 
which supported its claim that the defendants made fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
- 4 -
/ 12. In response to Interrogatory No. 6, a copy of which 
is attached hereto and made Exhibit lfBlf, plaintiffs stated that 
an individual had made "claims and assurances that the defen-
dants had wealth" and that other "contacts" had stated that the 
defendants1 name was "reliable and respected." Plaintiff had 
testified at deposition that the individual did not have the 
[kauthority to bind the Hogles. 
13. Plaintiff did not, in his answers to defendants' 
Interrogatories, identify or supply any documents which in any 
way relate to plaintiffs' claim that the defendants had made 
fraudulent misrepresentations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT 
MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST DEFENDANTS JAMES AND OWEN 
! HOGLE. 
Plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges that as a 
result of defendants' "careless and/ or negligent" false misrep-
resentations the parties entered into an agreement. In order to 
prevail plaintiff must prove all of the elements of fraud. 
Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah, 1980). These essen-
tial elements of fraud were set forth by the court in Conder v. 
A. L. Williams & Assoc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987): 
"(1) that a representation was made (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact 
(3) which was false (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
14 
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recklessly knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity (7) 
did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby 
induced to act (9) to his injury and damage.11 
Id at page 637. 
Defendants Jones and Owen Hogle are entitled to summary 
judgment on plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action. Plaintiffs' own 
testimony demonstrate there are no genuine dispute as to three 
of the above stated essential elements. 
A. The Hogles Did Not Misrepresent Facts to the Plain-
tiffs. 
The plaintiffs must first prove that the defendants 
caused false representations to be made to the plaintiffs. 
According to plaintiff's deposition testimony and answers to 
Interrogatories, neither of the Hogles made representations 
which induced the plaintiffs to enter into the agreement. 
Representations were made by an individual named Steven Brown 
and other "contacts". The plaintiffs do not identify these 
other "contacts". Plaintiff's testimony at deposition was that 
Steven Brown did not have the authority to bind the Hogles. 
B. The Plaintiffs Did Not Rely On Representations Of 
The Hogles In Entering Into The Agreement. 
To prevail at trial the plaintiffs must prove reliance 
upon the defendants' representations in entering the agreement. 
- 6 -
In subsection A above, defendants have shown that the Hogles did 
not misrepresent facts to the plaintiffs. It is not possible to 
rely on statements that were never made. The plaintiffs cannot 
claim reliance on statements of the Hogles which the plaintiffs 
have admitted do not exist. Similar to the case at hand is 
Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624 (Utah, 1960). In Dupler, the 
plaintiff had purchased the defendant's interest in oil wells. 
The plaintiff claimed that he had been induced to purchase these 
oil wells by the defendant's false representations. The Supreme 
Court of Utah affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant!s 
motion for summary judgment. The court based its decision on 
the fact that the plaintiff, in agreeing to buy the defendant's 
oil interests, had relied on representations made by individuals 
other than the defendant: 
"As a matter of law it is conceivable that a 
person might simultaneously rely on misrep-
resentations of divergent defendants. 
However, standing alone admissions by 
plaintiffs that they relied on others is 
sufficient proof to negative reliance on the 
present defendant." Id at page 636. 
In the instant case, as in Dupler, the plaintiffs have 
indicated that they relied on representations of others in 
entering into the agreement. Reliance on others negates reli-
ance on the Hogles. 
C. There Is No Genuine Issue That The Hogles Acted 
Knowingly Or Recklessly. 
- 7 -
The plaintiffs must prove that the false representations 
made by the Hogles were made knowingly and recklessly. In the 
subsections above, the Hogles argue that the evidence clearly 
shows that the Hogles did not make any representations to the 
plaintiffs which the plaintiffs then relied on in reaching an 
agreement with the defendants. Assuming arguendo that the Court 
finds that the Hogles did make misrepresentations to the 
plaintiffs, summary judgment is still proper as there is no 
genuine issue that the Hogles acted knowingly and/or recklessly 
in making representations. As was stated by the court in 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) 
"If the circumstances are such that the defen-
dant could exercise extraordinary influence 
over the plaintiff and the defendant was or 
should have been aware the plaintiff reposed 
trust and confidence in the defendant and 
reasonably relied on defendant's guidance, then 
the parties are said to be "in confidential 
relationship" . . . There are few relationships 
(such as parent-child, attorney-client, trust-
ee-cestui) which the law presumes to be confi-
dential. Id. at 302. 
As is set forth in the plaintiff's deposition, there is 
no question that the relationship between the plaintiffs and the 
Hogles did not rise to the level of a confidential relationship. 
There is no evidence which would suggest anything other than an 
arm's length transaction between the parties. The evidence 
indicates that the Hogles did not act knowingly or recklessly. 
In his deposition the plaintiff was asked a number of times what 
- 8 -
evidence he had to support a claim that the Hogles had knowingly 
made false statements. Repeatedly the plaintiffs were unable to 
present any evidence or testimony that by any stretch of the 
imagination would tend to demonstrate that the Hogles had 
knowingly and/or recklessly made false statements. Similarly, 
in their answer to Interrogatory No. 6 in which plaintiffs were 
asked to state each and every fact which supports their claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiffs did not even 
attempt to set forth facts which would indicate that the Hogles 
knowingly or recklessly made false statements. The plaintiffs 
in their Amended Complaint allege that the defendants acted 
"carelessly and/or negligently." Not only have the plaintiffs 
failed to produce a shred of evidence that the defendants acted 
knowingly or recklessly, but the plaintiffs do not even allege 
this essential element. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. 
Rule 9B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares 
that " . . . fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity 
. . . ." Plaintiffs1 second cause of action does not approach 
the standard contemplated by Rule 9B. There are over five 
defendants in this action. It is not possible to tell from the 
complaint which misrepresentations are attributed to which 
defendant. Plaintiffs have also failed to plead two of the 
- 9 -
essential elements of fraud; that the plaintiffs were induced by 
false representations made by the Hogles and that the Hogles 
knowingly or recklessly made false statements. Further, the 
alleged misrepresentations in the complaint did not satisfy the 
requirement that the misrepresentations be of a presently 
existing material fact, 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs ? Second Cause of Action in the Amended 
Complaint alleges fraudulent misrepresentations. In an action 
for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiffs must prove nine 
essential elements. Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment 
as there are no factual disputes on three essential elements. 
First, there is no question, based on the evidence presented by 
the plaintiff, Walter Larson, that the Hogles did not misrepre-
sent facts to the plaintiff. Secondly, as the Hogles did not 
misrepresent facts to the plaintiffs, there can be no question 
that the plaintiffs did not rely on representations of the 
Hogles in entering into agreements with the Hogles. Finally, at 
the deposition and in plaintiffs1 Answers to Defendants1 Inter-
rogatories, plaintiffs fail to present a shred of evidence that 
the Hogles knowingly and/or recklessly made false representa-
tions to the plaintiffs. 
In the motion before the court, the Hogles seek the 
alternative relief of a dismissal of plaintiffs1 Second Cause of 
- 10 -
Action. The procedural rules require that fraud be pleaded with 
particularly. At the very least, this requirement demands that 
all of the elements of fraud be set forth in the Complaint. The 
Second Cause of Action of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is 
deficient. The plaintiffs fail to plead two essential elements. 
Plaintiffs fail to allege that the plaintiffs were induced by 
false representations made by the Hogles and that the Hogles 
knowingly or recklessly made false statements. 
Another essential element of fraud is that the misrep-
resentation must be of a fact that existed at the time the 
representation was made. The plaintiff's Amended Complaint also 
fails in this respect. The representations set forth by the 
plaintiffs in their Second Cause of Action refer to promises to 
perform in the future. These allegations seem to be more suited 
to a claim for breach of contract. These allegations do not 
make for a proper claim of fraud. 
Dated this day of August, 1988. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
By 
Harry Caston 
Attorneys for Defendants 
James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. 
Hogle 
HC06/4 
ADDENDUM E 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN (3267) 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr, 
and Owen C. Hogle 
i 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
i 
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON 
and JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Counter-
Defendants . 
vs 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.f 
Defendants and Counter-
Claimants . 
REPLY POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS 
JAMES AND OWEN HOGLE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
FACTS 
1. The Affidavit tendered by plaintiff Walter Park 
Larson in opposition to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
disputes that defendants Gay and Bruno were the agents of 
defendants James and Owen Hogle. 
2. The Affidavit tendered by plaintiff Walter Park 
Larson does not dispute the facts that: 
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(a) The obligation of the parties did not arise 
until Larson Ford Sales had obtained Bankruptcy Court 
approval of its Plan of Reorganization. 
(b) That there was no breach of contract. 
(c) That the defendants are entitled to sanctions 
under Rule 11 as the allegations of the defendants1 
Amended Complaint are utterly false. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE 
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
The quote set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum from State 
v. Bonnett, 201 P.2d 939, fits squarely with the cases cited by 
the defendants in their Points and Authorities. As the contract 
in the instant case clearly indicates that the plaintiffs 
intended to deal only with defendants Bruno and Gay, the plain-
tiffs cannot subsequently claim that defendants James and Owen 
Hogle were parties to the contract. It is clear from the form 
of the contract that the plaintiffs were dealing with defendants 
Bruno and Gay in their individual capacity and on behalf of 
HBGH, a Utah corporation. 
- 3 -
POINT II 
SHOULD THE COURT DETERMINE THAT DEFENDANTS OWEN AND JAMES 
HOGLE WERE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT OF MARCH 5, 1983, 
DEFENDANTS ARE STILL ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants Owen and James Hoglefs Motion for Summary 
Judgment does not rest upon whether or not the Hogles were 
parties to the contract of March 5, 1983. In support of their 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Hogles have set forth evidence 
which shows that the obligation of the defendants was subject to 
an unfulfilled condition, and further that there was no breach 
of contract. The plaintiffs have produced no evidence to 
dispute these allegations. As there are no disputes as to the 
material facts, defendants James and Owen Hogle are entitled to 
a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs may not escape the application of the 
parol evidence rule. It is clear that the plaintiffs were 
dealing only with defendants Gay and Bruno individually and as 
agents of HBGH. However, should the court determine that the 
Hogles were parties to the contract, the Hogles are still 
entitled to their Motion for Summary Judgment as there is no 
dispute as to any of the remaining material facts. 
- 4 -
Dated this ZJC/ day of October, 1988. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
James and Owen Hogle 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I» the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 0?J?£/ day 
of October, 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
JOHN J. BORSOS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
807 East South Temple, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Mr. Dennis W. Gay 
780 West 889 South 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Stanley Adams, Esq. 
Attorney for Stephen P. Bruno 
521 Sixth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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ADDENDUM F 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen C. Hogle 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, 
SYBIL LARSON and 
JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and 
Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al., 
Defendants and 
Counter-Claimants, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On or about July 1, 1983, plaintiffs filed their 
Complaint. 
2. The Complaint contained two causes of action. The first 
cause of action alleged breach of contract. The second cause of 
action sought relief based on "carelessly and/or negligently made 
false representations made by the defendants". 
3. The defendants' first motion sought a dismissal of the 
second cause of action or, in the alternative, for a more definite 
statement as the plaintiffs had failed to properly plead the 
2 
elements of fraud as required by Rule 9B of -the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure• 
4. On May 29, 1984f this Court granted defendants7 motion 
for a more definite statement and allowed the plaintiffs 10 days to 
amend their complaint. 
5. Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint within the time 
provided by the court. 
6. As did the original complaint, the amended complaint 
contained causes of action for breach of the contract known as the 
"Agreement and Escrow" and for "carelessly and/or negligently made 
false representations". 
7. The Hogles moved the Court for partial summary judgment 
on the cause of action for carelessly and/or negligently made false 
misrepresentations. The points presented in the supporting 
memorandum were that: 
(a) the Hogles did not misrepresent facts to the 
plaintiffs; 
(b) the plaintiffs did not rely on representations of 
the Hogles in entering into the agreement and 
escrow; 
(c) the Hogles did not act knowingly and recklessly; and 
(d) the plaintiffs had not pled fraud with specificity. 
8. On August 26, 1988 the Court granted the Hogles' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. 
9. The Hogles then moved the Court for summary judgment on 
the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. The Points and 
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Authorities in Support of that motion proved to the Court that, 
based on the plaintiffs' own testimony and documents: 
(a) the Hogles never entered into a contract with the 
plaintiffs; 
(b) even if the Hogles had contracted with the 
plaintiffs, the defendants7 obligations were 
subject to an unfulfilled condition precedent and 
that the amendment to the contract provided that 
the purchasers could "cease active pursuit of the 
plan of reorganization of Larson Ford, Inc."; and 
(c) in fact the contract had not been breached. 
10. On October 7, 1988, ruling from the bench, the Court 
granted the Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. The plaintiff then claimed that there was a new theory 
that plaintiffs7 previous counsel had failed to advance. This new 
theory was that the Hogles were part of a scheme to defraud the 
plaintiff. This theory held that the Hogles conspired with Stephen 
Wade. The plan was that the Hogles would deplete the plaintiffs' 
business assets which would then allow Stephen Wade to purchase the 
assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced price. 
12. The Court granted the plaintiffs' Motion to File an 
Amended Complaint to allow the plaintiffs to pursue this new 
theory. 
13. The plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (which should properly 
be denominated Second Amended Complaint) contains three causes of 
action. The first two causes of action are the same as were 
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contained in the original Complaint and
 r the plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint. These causes of action are breach of the 
contract dated March 5, 1983, and negligent misrepresentation. The 
third cause of action alleges fraud. This new cause of action is 
where the plaintiff alleges that the Hogles acted in collusion with 
Stephen Wade to deplete Larson Ford's assets which would then allow 
Wade to purchase the entity at a reduced price. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND 
CARELESSLY AND/OR NEGLIGENTLY MADE FALSE MISREPRESENTATIONS 
HAVE BEEN LITIGATED AND DISMISSED BY THE COURT. 
The defendant previously filed two Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment addressed 
the plaintiffs' claim of carelessly made and/or false 
misrepresentations. The Court granted this motion and dismissed 
that cause of action. The defendants then moved the Court for 
summary judgment on the cause of action for breach of contract. 
The Court granted this motion as well. After granting the 
defendants' second motion, the plaintiff pled with the Court to 
allow the plaintiff to pursue a cause of action that had not been 
presented to the Court due to the fumbling of the plaintiffs' 
previous counsel. This new theory was that the Hogles had colluded 
with Stephen Wade to drive down the value of Larson Ford. The 
Court allowed the defendant to file an Amended Complaint to pursue 
this new theory. The plaintiffs' new complaint included this new 
cause of action. The new complaint also included causes of action 
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for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation - the same 
exact causes of action that were previously dismissed by the Court. 
The defendant contends that the Court's dismissal of the 
causes of action for breach of contract and negligent and/or 
careless misrepresentation became the law of this case. These 
issues have been litigated by the parties. These matters were 
fully briefed and argued. In presenting these issues to the Court, 
the plaintiff had the extremely competent assistance of his present 
attorney. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court determined that 
the applicable case law required dismissal of the causes of action 
of breach of contract and negligent and/or careless 
misrepresentations. These issues are now res judicata. If the 
plaintiff disagrees with the Court's dismissal, the plaintiff has 
the right to appeal. The plaintiff does not have the right to 
include issues that have been litigated and dismissed. Should 
the Court disagree with the defendant on the issue of res judicata, 
the defendant incorporates the defendant's previous Motions for 
Summary Judgment within this memorandum. The defendant will be 
prepared to discuss these issues with the Court at the hearing 
which is scheduled for June 12, 1992. 
POINT TWO; THE PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD SHOULD 
BE DISMISSED. 
A. The Plaintiffs' Own Deposition Testimony Proves There Was 
No Collusion Between Stephen Wade and the Hogles. 
The Court granted the plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended 
Complaint to allow the plaintiff to pursue the theory that the 
Hogles acted in collusion with Stephen Wade to defraud the 
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plaintiff. The plaintiffs7 theory is that the Hogles and other 
defendants would deplete the plaintiff's business assets. Stephen 
Wade would then purchase the assets of Larson Ford at a greatly 
reduced price. On page 23 of the Defendants7 Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant Hogle's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, the 
defendants set forth the deposition testimony of plaintiff Park 
Larson. As the defendant asks that the Court review that 
memorandum, the defendant will not burden the Court by repeating in 
full the arguments contained therein or the excerpt of the 
plaintiff's deposition testimony. The defendant will repeat the 
crucial observation that at the deposition the plaintiff was given 
an opportunity to set forth any evidence he had that there was 
collusion between Stephen Wade and any of the defendants. The 
plaintiff's own sworn testimony demonstrates that there was no 
fraud and/or collusion. 
B. The Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories Fail to 
Demonstrate Any Collusion Between the Hogles and Stephen 
Wade. 
In Interrogatory Number 4 of the defendant's Interrogatories 
and Request for Production of Documents dated January 28, 1992, the 
defendant sought to discover the factual basis upon which the 
plaintiff based his claim that the defendants and Stephen Wade had 
a plan to deplete the plaintiff's resources so as to allow Stephen 
Wade to purchase the assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced 
price. A copy of plaintiff's answers signed on May 19, 1992 are 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. As did the plaintiff's deposition 
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testimony, the answer to Interrogatory Number 4 demonstrates that 
there was no collusion between the Hogles and Stephen Wade. The 
foundation upon which the plaintiff7s claim rests is that the 
Hogles had approached the plaintiff to purchase Larson Ford. The 
plaintiff's own previous testimony was that he was not approached 
by the Hogles but by a third party who the plaintiff admitted had 
no authority to speak for or to bind the Hogles. The contention 
that the Hogles had made statements to the plaintiff also must 
fail. This Court has previously ruled that the parole evidence 
rule prevents the plaintiff from claiming that there were 
statements and representations outside of the contract as the 
contract and its amendments completely set forth the agreement 
between the parties. The Court has also previously ruled that the 
Hogles were not parties to any of the contracts. As was stated in 
the Affidavit of Owen Hogle, the Hogles7 relationship to the sale 
of Larson Ford was that they were funding the corporation that was 
purchasing Larson Ford. 
C. The Plaintiff's Complaint Should Be Dismissed For Failure 
to Include an Indispensable Party. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure holds that 
"a person who is subject to service of process 
and whose joinder will not deprive the court 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
action shall be joined as a party in the 
action if (1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already 
parties..." 
In the instant case the plaintiff claims that Stephen Wade acted in 
collusion with the defendants in order to defraud the plaintiff. 
If what the plaintiff says is true, Stephen Wade would then be 
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responsible for a portion of the plaintiffs damages, if any. If 
Stephen Wade were not made a party, the Hogles would then be 
responsible for Stephen Wade's share of these alleged damages. It 
is for this reason that Stephen Wade is an indispensable party. 
Section 78:12-26(3) of the Utah Code sets forth a three year 
statute of limitations on fraud. As Stephen Wade, an indispensable 
party, cannot be made a defendant the complaint should be 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants previously sought and obtained summary judgment 
on the causes of action for breach of contract and negligent and/or 
carelessly made misrepresentations. Following the Court's granting 
of the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff 
requested that he be allowed to file an amended complaint to state 
a new cause of action. This cause of action was based upon the 
theory that the Hogles had conspired with Stephen Wade. The theory 
held that the Hogles really never intended to purchase the assets 
of Larson Ford; all along, the Hogles intended to run Larson Ford 
into the ground. Their co-conspirator, Stephen Wade, would then 
purchase the assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced price. 
The Court allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint to 
include this new cause of action. The problem is that the 
plaintiff's new complaint included the causes of action that had 
previously been dismissed. There are procedural remedies that 
could have been sought to obtain relief from the Court's ruling on 
the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. These remedies 
9 
include those provided by Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The plaintiff did not seek such relief. The plaintiff 
did not at any time ask the Court to set aside the ruling on the 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court dismissed the causes of action for breach of 
contract and negligent and/or carelessly made misrepresentations 
based upon the plaintiff's own testimony. During the deposition 
and during the briefing period as well as at oral argument, the 
plaintiff was represented by his present counsel. As these actions 
were dismissed, there is no reason why they should be included in 
the plaintiff's present complaint. 
The new cause of action should also be dismissed. This cause 
of action alleges that the Hogles depleted the assets of Larson 
Ford so that Stephen Wade could buy the remainder at a reduced 
price. The plaintiff has been asked on two occasions to produce 
whatever evidence he has to prove fraud and/or collusion between 
the Hogles and Stephen Wade. In his own deposition, the plaintiff 
offered a hearsay statement which does not include any evidence of 
fraud or collusion. In responding to Interrogatory Number 4, the 
plaintiff commenced by stating that the Hogles had approached him 
with an offer to buy the business, and how the Hogles had made 
statements and promises. The plaintiff had previously testified 
that the Hogles did not approach him to purchase Larson Ford. The 
Court previously noted that the Hogles were not parties to any of 
the contracts, and further, that the purchasers had the right to no 
longer pursue the purchase of Larson Ford. There is another reason 
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why the plaintiff's action for fraud should be dismissed. The 
plaintiff alleges that Stephen Wade was a co-conspirator. In this 
regard, he would also be responsible for the plaintiff's damages. 
As the three year statute of limitations for fraud has expired, 
this indispensable party cannot be brought into this lawsuit. 
DATED this S?6~/A day of May, 1992. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
By: // /Sjc^fc 
rry Caston 
:orneys for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the of May, 1992, true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
John J. Borsos 
370 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hans M. Scheffler 
311 South State, #380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
eliz\harry\hoglsms5.mem 
ADDENDUM G 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN (3267) 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen C. Hogle 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON 
and JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Counter-
Defendants . 
vs. 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al., 
Defendants and Counter-
Claimants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF OWEN HOGLE 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant being first duly sworn deposes and states: 
1. That from March 21, 1983, HBGH supplied in excess of 
$150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales. 
2. The Hogles were never the assigns of Bruno and Gay. 
3. That defendants James and Owen Hogle were not and 
have never been officers, directors or shareholders or HBGH. 
n D c 9 r; o 
4. HBGH became a corporation on March 22, 1983, 
Dated this /#$ day of September, 1988. 
wen C. Hogle /^y O g^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /9- day of 
September, 1988. 
Notary Public/ 
My commission expires: Residing at: 
HC06/17 
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ADDENDUM H 
A Mr. Stephen Brown told us that, Mr. Gary Routh 
told us that, Mr. Bruno told us that, and Mr. Gay told us 
that. 
• Q That it was to be a corporation? 
A Right. 
Q And you were dealing with H.B.G.H. as an intended 
corpora t ion ; i s t h a t r i gh t ? 
A Uh-huh (a f f i rmat ive) . 
Q I think you have to speak audibly . 
A Yes. 
Q Can you show me anywhere in there where the 
Hogles signed—and. there are some other documents, 
Mrs. Larson, that you didn't look at— I will contend 
that these documents are fairly the same, but I would ask 
you to go through them. These are the ones that were 
supplied to me by yourself as being the plaintiff in this 
matter. 
A On page 5 of 45, it says "H.CB.H." 
Q Incorporated? 
A Yes. 
MR. BORSOS: Let the record show that she is pointing 
to Exhibit 4 of the deposition of Park Larson on the last 
page, page 5, and that she is referring to the letters 
"H.B.G.H.," without any words "intended corporation." 
THE WITNESS: This agreement says "H.G.B.H." Not 
1^ 
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84070 
im\) 571-0769 
ADDENDUM I 
1 backer or — 
2 Q Could you have devised a plan that, perhaps, the 
3 parties could agree upon? 
4 A No. I had — We'd already agreed on what the plan 
5 was going to be under our agreement. Anything less than that 
6 was unacceptable. 
7 At that point in time, the Hogles couldn't perform, 
8 or wouldn't, and didn't. 
9 Q You claim, do you not, that the defendants made 
10 fraudulent misrepresentations; isn't that correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q What were those fraudulent misrepresentations? 
13 A Well, very clearly the fact that they were going to 
14 be able to perform and meet the requirements of the agreement 
15 that we'd — that we'd agreed upon for a plan. 
16 Q Is that all of the fraudulent misrepresentations? 
17 A I think that it's -- All the fraudulent 
18 misrepresentations at this point as I think about it would be 
19 involved with their failure to perform on the basis of the 
20 agreement that we'd drawn up, which was the requirements that 
21 I had set for me to relinquish my position and ownership of 
22 the business, giving up my stock to the Hogles so that they 
23 could become my successor as debtor-in-possession. 
24 Q Please correct me if I'm mischaracterizing what 
25 you're telling me, but, basically, the fraudulent 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
K1 
1 misrepresentations which they made to you were what they were 
2 going to do to fund your plan; is that correct? Is that your 
3 claim? 
4 1 A I think that — that plus their — their failure to 
5 be able to inject funds into the business on the schedule 
6 which they had told me they would. That would be a part of it 
7 though not directly associated with the plan itself. 
8 Q When they made you these, what you claim to be, 
9 false representations, you claim the defendants knew they were 
10 false when they were made? 
11 A I can't second-guess what they thought. 
12 Q Do you have any evidence upon which to base a 
13 belief that the defendants when they made these statements 
14 which you believe are false misstatements knew they were false 
15 when they made them? 
16 HR. PACE: Excuse me a minute, Counsel. Just give me a 
17 minute. 
18 MR. CASTON: Let the record reflect that he's consulting 
19 with the witness. 
20 MR. PACE: You may show that I'm consulting him. 
21 (Discussion held off the record between the 
22 witness and his counsel.) 
23 THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that question again. 
24 Q (By Mr. Caston) Certainly. 
25 You've told me there were certain things which the 
c}^buQanl^xial(S Certified Shorthand Reporters 
C O 
1 defendants told you which, more or less, were not true. And 
2 these are — 
3 A Well, they never materialized, they didn't ever 
4 come to pass. 
5 Q You claim — 
6 And you can go through your amended complaint, if 
7 you like, so you don't have to take my word for it. 
8 — and please correct me if I'm wrong — that the 
9 defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations to you. 
10 MR. PACE: You want him to confirm what's in the 
11 complaint? Is that your question? 
12 MR. CASTON: Yes. Not only the complaint, but I also 
13 want to know if he feels that they made fraudulent 
14 misrepresentations. 
15 THE WITNESS: Well, the representations that were made to 
16 me were that the Hogle group, as Steve Brown said, had the 
17 bucks, had the intense desire to own, operate and manage 
18 Larson Ford Sales, Inc., that they had extensive collateral 
19 that would be used to substitute for S.B.A. collateral that I 
20 had provided personally, that they were fully capable and able 
21 to financially follow through with the plan that we agreed 
22 upon. Those representations was made to me by — not only by 
23 Mr. Brown initially but later on by Mr. Bruno. 
24 Q (By Mr. Caston) But Mr. Brown didn't have the 
25 authority to bind the Hogles; isn't that correct? 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
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document here. 
Q (By Mr. Caston) Before we proceed in another 
direction, let me bring back to your attention that before we 
went on the break I told you that I was going to ask questions 
regarding what you believe to be specific misrepresentations 
that the defendants made to you. Is that pretty much what 
happened? 
A Yes. 
Q And I gave you a copy of the amended complaint, and 
I told you that those were what you allege to be the specific 
misrepresentations which you claim the defendants made to you. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And they are, in fact, contained in there, are they 
not? When I say "in there," I'm referring to the paragraph of 
the amended complaint — 
A Shall we be specific as to some of these items, 
such as paragraph 9 under the Second Cause Of Action — 
Q Sure. 
A — which you've underlined, I believe; maybe those 
are your marks, they are not mine: 
"Defendants carelessly and/or negligently 
made false representations that they could and 
would perform the conditions described in the 
agreements between the parties." 
They have definitely made some assurance to me and 
*]<{M&6urfQnfTfl&KiaW C^edShorthw* Reporter* 
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1 to my wife. 
2 Q What was that that they told you? 
3 A That they could and would perform the conditions 
4 described in the agreements between the parties, that they 
5 would assume the debt, that they would get — 
6 Q Do you have any information on which to base a 
7 belief that that statement was false when it was made? 
8 A I'm — I have to assume that it was. Because they 
9 didn't follow through with it, it had to be. 
10 Q Do you have any evidence on which to base that 
11 belief? 
12 A I was very suspicious that Mr. Hogle was not 
13 present during the negotiations. 
14 Q That's the only evidence you have to base the 
15 belief that that statement was false? 
16 A Not necessarily. 
17 Q What evidence do you have? 
18 A The fact that when we got down to the final 
19 negotiating stage necessary in meeting, that I would have 
20 liked, as I said, to have had Mr. Hogle there. 
21 I was concerned that Owen C. Hogle's brother, James 
22 Junior, who I had been assured all along was a party to the 
23 agreement — 
24 Q Who assured you? 
25 A Mr. Bruno on a number of occasions, Dennis Gay, the 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
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ADDENDUM J 
1 demonstrations to Plaintiffs through August 
2 of 1983 at no cost, to allow Plaintiffs to 
3 purchase trucks or cars at invoice price, to 
4 to take on up to $2,100,000.00 liabilities of 
5 the dealership." 
6 I want to know every fact upon which you base that 
7 those statements were false when they were made. 
8 A My hesitancy in answering the question is — is 
9 merely to try and recall items that I don't have in my 
10 possession right now, Counsel. I don't have any of — I don't 
11 have any notes, I don't have any documents of any kind in 
12 front of me. 
13 Q So at this time you have no evidence on which to 
14 base a belief that — 
15 A Not with me. I don't have anything here which I 
16 would proffer to you or show to you or refer to to be 
17 specific. 
18 Q What kind of things would you refer to to show that 
19 what the defendants said was false? What type of documents? 
20 A I can't be specific on that, either. 
21 Q Would you take it upon yourself to review those 
22 documents and present them to me as the documents which you 
23 believe support your claim as to what the defendants did, that 
24 the defendants lied to you? 
25 MR. PACE: Sure. 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
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THE WITNESS: Yes, I would. Anything that I have, I'll — 
I'll locate. 
MR. PACE: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Caston) Did you rely on these statements? 
A I relied on the statements made by the defendants, 
very definitely. 
Q How is it you relied on them? 
A They were given to me as an absolute assurance, the 
final discussion at 2 o'clock that Saturday morning — that — 
that Sunday morning. 
In fact, I recall specifically my wife telling 
Mr. Bruno that we were under a certain degree of duress here 
timewise, "Hammered out this agreement with you, there are 
other people that we've been working with, we are turning this 
matter now over to you to meet the requirements which have 
been agreed upon and what are we going to do and what happens 
to us if you don't perform?" 
Mr. Bruno specifically stated — Well, he said, 
"We're going to perform." 
And when my wife expressed her concern again, he 
said, "And if we don't, you can sue us." 
We were told at that time that unless we eliminated 
all uncertainties in the agreement before that meeting was 
concluded, if we did not iron out all the details, that 
Mr. Hogle and, I assume, Bruno and Gay or whoever among their 
Certified Shorthand Reporter* 
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ADDENDUM K 
1 A Correct. 
2 Q Do you have any recollection of whom was present 
3 when you were told that the Hogles were colluding with Stephen 
4 Wade? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Do you recall what exactly it was that they told 
7 you? 
8 A As I recall, the essence of the information that I 
i 
9 got was that Wades and the Hogles had been in contact with 
10 each other with the idea that was discussed being the fact 
11 that Wade had an inside track of some kind with Ford that they 
12 would be approved as the dealer, that if the Hogle group . 
13 wanted to protect the investment that they'd made in the 
14 dealership to that point in time, in order to have the 
15 cooperation of the Wades, were — were they successful in 
16 getting a creditors' plan accepted, if the Hogle group wanted 
17 to get their money out that they would withdraw. 
18 Q Do you have any knowledge as to when you were told 
19 this? 
20 A No, I donft. 
21 Q Do you have any document which would reference when 
22 you were told this? 
23 A That I don't — I don't know. I do have a lot of 
24 notes left from meetings and — and memos that I made that 
25 were — 
"J^bu^andJiMialeS Certified Shorthand Reporters 
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ADDENDUM L 
INTERROGATORY 4: Regarding your belief that the 
defendants were involved in a scheme in which the defendants 
planned to deplete plaintiffs' resources after which another 
individual in collusion with the defendants would purchase 
plaintiff's assets at a greatly reduced price, please state: 
(a) each and every fact upon which you base your belief; 
(b) the title, location and individual in possession of 
each document which supports your belief. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 4: In January, 1983, the hogles 
approached plaintiff to buy his business. Plaintiff had had 
several offers from various prospective purchasers, including his 
neighbor, Stephen Wade. The Hogles made many promises and 
statements (upon which plaintiffs' relied) to plaintiff which are 
the subject of this lawsuit. One particular crucial element in all 
negotiations was the deadline in Bankruptcy Court for plaintiff to 
submit a plan to creditors—March 21, 1983, This date was known to 
all defendants and it was this date by which plaintiff had to 
submit a plan in Bankruptcy for approval of the creditors. The 
Hogles, despite the recommendations of an auditor, said they would 
purchase the dealership and agreed to various provisions that would 
have to satisfy the creditors of the dealership. The Hogles agreed 
to substitute collateral, to get approval of Ford Motor Credit, and 
to pledge their personal wealth, reputation and effort to meeting 
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the deadline so they could purchase the business. The Bogles took 
over the dealership and began several questionable business 
practices of hiring and firing employees, having an apparent HGoing 
out of Business Sale", and not paying the heat bill so that 
utilities were turned off for several days. These business 
practices caused the business to lose approximately $150,000.00. 
Prior to the bankruptcy deadline, Stephen Wade and other 
potential buyers, continued to request that the plaintiffs sell the 
dealership to them. Plaintiffs refused these reports because of 
their March 5th, 1983 Agreement with the defendants. Plaintiffs 
had taken Owen Hogle around to the various creditors to fulfill the 
March 5, 1983 agreement and had urged Owen Bogle to contact the 
other creditors of the dealership. Plaintiffs became worried as the 
deadline approached and the defendants had not attempted to fulfil 
their promises or their obligations under the Agreements signed by 
them. After meetings with plaintiff1 s bankruptcy attorney, 
defendants refused to abide by the terms of their agreements and 
decided not to purchase the dealership. On March 22, defendants 
finally incorporated BBGB. Then BBGB entered into an agreement to 
reimburse Owen Bogle for the money he had invested into the 
dealership. On or about March 22, 1983, the defendants made 
plaintiffs a —take it or leave it—offer to rescind the March 5th 
Agreement. The defendants did submit an inadequate plan to the 
6 
Bankruptcy Court. Stephen Wade again made an offer the plaintiffs 
to buy the dealership but he too would not satisfy creditors of the 
dealership. 
Plaintiffs having surrendered the operation of the dealership 
to the Hogles and having relied upon the Hogles to comply with the 
March 5th agreement, were under severe duress to continue working 
with the defendants. Plaintiffs submitted the defendant's terms 
for payment as their plan. Stephen Wade submitted a plan because 
he was a $130.00 creditor owed by plaintiff's bankrupt corporation. 
Wade's plan made better provision for payment of the major 
creditors than did defendant's inspired plan. Walter P. Larson 
told defendants that they would not succeed in this bankruptcy 
proceeding unless the defendants satisfied the creditors and those 
voting for the plans. Defendants amended their plan once and then 
withdrew their support entirely leaving only the Wade plan. After 
their withdrawal and support of the Wade plan, the defendants — 
unlike other creditors-- received back from Wade and the Bankruptcy 
court all of monies they had invested in the dealership and 
defendant's attorneys received back the fees charged defendants, 
even though their interest was not stated in either of the 
competing Bankruptcy plans. 
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Plaintiffs have learned that the scenario of the their case 
patterns the scenario of several other ventures entered into by the 
defendants. Plaintiffs believe that the Hogles have a history of 
real estate dealings with Bruno. Bruno, who has been involved with 
several real estate ventures with defendants Hogle, was charged and 
convicted of felony HUD violations using a "strawman scheme" (Utah 
Federal District Court # CR85-00135S). In November, 1984 Gay and 
James Hogle (a purported silent investor) petitioned the court in 
DSR Southern Development Inc v Stephen Bruno. Utah State Third 
Distract Court Number C87-6053, to stop Bruno's interference with 
properties that all of them had owned together and to protect James 
Hogle Jr's unrecorded interest based on his personal guarantees. 
A default judgment for $1,125,000 was entered against Bruno, who 
was represented by William Thurman, a partner of the firm now 
representing the hogles in this case. 
(b) Attorney, John J. Borsos, 370 East South Temple, 
Suite #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
INTERROGATORY 5: Please state with specificity the 
damages you claim you suffered as a result of the defendant's 
actions together with the dollar amount which you are claiming for 
each element of damage. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 5: Defendants agreed to pay 
plaintiffs $175,000.00 of the purchase of the dealership. In 
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ADDENDUM M 
JOHN J. BORSOS 384 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
807 East South Temple, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 533-8883 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
> n — — • in i i ii i i i i ~ ~ — — ^ — — — — ^ — . . - ^ — . ^ — i 
l 
WALTER P. LARSON and SYBIL LARSON, t 
Plaintiffs, ! AFFIDAVIT OF 
i WALTER P. LARSON 
vs. 
STEPHEN P, BRUNO, DENNIS W. GAY, I Civil No. C-83-SS42 
JAMES HOGLE, JR., and OWEN C. HOGLE, I 
as individuals; HBGH INC. PARTNERSHIP} i 
and, as partners, i 
Defendants. t JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
_L 
State of California
 } 
County'of San Diego j 8 $ 
COMES NOW Walter P. Larson, Plaintiff 1n the above-entitled action, and 
having been duly sworn and deposed, states as follows: 
1. That he is the Plaintiff In the above-entitled action. 
2. That he has read the Notion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
filed by Defendants James and Owen Hogle. 
3. That he was approached in early January of 1983 by Stephen P. Bruno 
and Dennis Gay, who were later Identified as agents for Owen C. Hogle and 
James Hogle, Jr., concerning the sale of Larson Ford Sales which was then 1n 
a bankruptcy. 
4. That at all times during the negotiations for the sale of Larson 
Ford Sales, Bruno and Gay represented that they were acting for and on behalf 
of James Hogle, Jr., and Owen Hogle. 
6. That on January IS, 1983, he had a meeting with Defendants Bruno, 
Gay and James Hogle. During that meeting, he was told by the Defendants that 
the Individual defendants were all the principals of the earnest money offer 
for the purchase of Larson Ford Sales. 
6. That in February, 1983, he personally led Defendants James and Owen 
Hogle on a tour of the business premises of Larson Ford Sales. He took Owen 
Hogle and James Hogle, along with Steven Brown and Gary Routh, on a tour of 
the entire dealership, including the show-room floor, customer lounge, 
offices and meeting rooms upstairs, parts department, service department, 
body shop, and other parts storage areas, as well 6$ a walk through the 
outside ground and property fence lines. 
7. That he found both James Hogle, Jr., and Owen C. Hogle to be very 
Impressed. He answered all questions they had concerning the dealership and 
was told by them that Mr. Bruno and Mr. Gay would be working with him on 
details of the takeover of Larson Ford by the Hogles. 
8. That on February 17, 1983, he met with Defendants James Hogle, 
Bruno and Gay for the purpose of extending the deadline set forth in the 
February 4, 1983, agreement. 
9. That on February 18, 1983, the parties all agreed that the contin-
gencies contained In the February 4, 1983, agreement were Lo be removed by 
February 25, 1983. 
10. That later 1n February, 1983, a meeting was held at Larson Ford 
Sales with the Plaintiff and Defendants Bruno and Owen Hogle. During this 
meeting, said Defendants informed Plaintiff that their attorneys were 
communicating with the Bankruptcy Court judge concerning a possible loan. 
11. That the Hogles visited the dealership a number of other times, and 
it was common knowledge that they were buying Larson Ford. This awareness 
reached the point that, on one occasion, an employee reported to him that 
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James Hogle, Jr., had just been seen in a parked car across the street from 
the dealership observing the dealership and watch1rig customers come and go. 
12. That at 6very meeting with Bruno and Steve Brown or Dennis Gay, Mr. 
Bruno, who was the negotiator for the Hogles, always referred to the fact 
that he was acting upon instruction of James Hogle and Owen Hogle and that he 
was reporting progress directly to them. 
13. That on March 2, 1983, a Finder's Fee Agreement was made and 
entered into by Wardley Corporation and the individual Defendants. Pursuant 
to this agreement, the Individual Defendants agreed to pay a finder's fee of 
$75,000 for the purchase of Larson Ford Sales. 
14. That 1n March, 1983, Jerry Christensen met with him and Defendants 
Bruno, Gay and Owen Hogle at Larson Ford Sales. At this meeting, Larson was 
informed that Mr. Christensen was to be the general manager and that he would 
receive a salary from the Individual Defendants 1n the sum of $3,000.00 per 
month plus a percentage of the profits. 
15. That on March 5, 1983, an Agreement 1n Escrow was signed by HBGH, 
Inc., an Intended corporation, and Walter Larson. The parties to that 
agreement agreed to Incorporate the terms and conditions of the February 4, 
1983, Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the addendum thereto. 
16. That an amendment to the March 5, 1983, agreement modified the 
terms of payment and the purchasers; l.e, the individual Defendants, agreed 
to file a bankruptcy plan by March 20, 1983. 
17. That on March 10, 1983, Randy Call, the bankruptcy attorney for 
Larson Ford Sales, met with Bin Thurman, Defendant Bruno and Walter Larson 
to discuss a lease with option to purchase the assets of Larson Ford Sales 
and to discuss the plan for reorganization. 
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IS. That on March 11, 1983, following the Instructions of Defendant 
Owen Hogle, Plaintiff Walter Larson deposited all outstanding shares of 
Larson Ford Sales Into an escrow with Harold Stephens. 
19. That on March 14, 1983, after Plaintiff Halter Larson had to inform 
the employees of Larson Ford Sales that he had to terminate their employment, 
Defendant Owen Hogle announced to all such employees that they were rehired. 
From that day on, Defendant Owen Hogle took up residence in the offices of 
Larson Ford Sales and assumed the responsibility for operating the 
dealership. 
20. That on March 18, 1983, Defendant Owen Hogle promised to obtain 
operating funds for the business. 
21. That on March 21, 1983, after the Individual Defendants had 
threatened not to submit a plan in the Bankruptcy Court, an agreement was 
signed by Plaintiff Walter Larson, HBGH, Inc., and Defendant Bruno. That 
agreement provided that certain financing needed to be obtained. 
22. That on March 22, 1983, a Disclosure Statement and Plan of Reor-
ganization was filed In the Bankruptcy Court. On that date, Defendants 
Bruno, Gay and Owen Kogle also agreed that all the money which Defendant Owen 
Hogle would invest in Larson Ford Sales would be repaid at the interest rate 
of 12 percent prior to any withdrawals. Furthermore, Defendant Owen Hogle 
was to have access to all books and records of HBGH, Inc., and Larson Ford 
Sales. Furthermore, Defendant Owen Hogle was entitled to participate in all 
management decisions and was to be consulted prior to any alteration or 
action which materially affected either entity. 
23. That on March 24, 1983, a First Amended Disclosure Statement was 
filed 1n the Bankruptcy Court. In that disclosure statement, HBGH, Inc., was 
represented as having been formed for the specific purpose of purchasing the 
assets of Larson Ford Sales. 
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24. That Defendants Owen Hogle and Gay had agreed to specific funding 
and financial backing of HBGH, Inc., in order to facilitate and properly fund 
the purchase of Larson Ford Sales. Defendants Owen Hogle and Gay had also 
. arranged for $300,000 cash, which was generated through assets other than 
those of the debtor, Larson Ford Sales, to be used in funding the purchase. 
25. That the disclosure statement was modified on April 21, 1983, 
wherein investors were not limited to Defendants Owen Hogle and 6ay, but 
would Include anonymous Investors who had alleged cash reserves available of 
one-half mill ion dollars. 
26. That Defendants Owen Hogle and Gay filed personal financial 
statements with the Bankruptcy Court and resumes to accompany the disclosure 
statements filed in the Bankruptcy Court. 
27. That Defendants James and Owen Hogle made no effort to substitute 
collateral to satisfy the debts of Larson Ford Sales. 
28. That Defendants James and Owen Hogle did not vote for the Larson 
Ford Sales Plan of Reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court. 
29. That Defendant Owen Hogle operated and managed the business. In 
fact, he held a "Going Out for Business Sale." 
30. That Defendants failed to pay the utilities of the dealership in 
March 1983. 
31. That the Hogles themselves, through their actions, conduct, and 
words, indicated the following facts to him; 
a. That they were intending to purchase Larson Ford Sales through 
the Bankruptcy Court by supporting the Debtors Plan of Reorganization, which 
they would co-draft with Larson Ford Sales law firm. 
b. That Owen Hogle would continue operating the dealership until 
the Plan of Reorganization was approved and then he would operate all of his 
business from Larson Ford Sales. He personally signed checks and handed 
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these to the employees. He performed all the functions of an owner so that 
Walter Larson left the premises and let Owen Hogle operate as owner. 
c. That when organizing the business, Owen C, Hogle told Walter 
Larson at the dealership with regard to Owen Hogle*s responsibility of 
running the dealership and providing the necessary funds, "It is my responsi-
bility, and I'll get the job done." 
32. That at all times during the course of negotiations and after the 
contracts were entered Into, his accountant was given instructions to fully 
cooperate with Stephen Bruno, Dennis Gay, Owen C. Hogle and James Hogle. All 
information available to Walter Larson was given to them regarding the 
financial condition of the business and the activities of the business. 
33. That in a meeting with the Hogle representatives on February 9, 
1983, he was asked to make available to Hogles* CPA or auditor any and all 
financial records held by Larson Ford at the dealership located at 5500 South 
State Street that they asked to inspect. 
34. That he agreed and complied with this request, with the under-
standing that the Hogles needed hands-on verification of financial informa-
tion which he had been given by Mr. Paul Jones, Larson Ford*s treasurer and 
comptroller* and had supplied to them, 
35. That he informed Defendants Stephen P. Bruno, Dennis W. Gay and 
Owen C. Hogle that he could not convey to them the franchise for Larson Ford 
without the approval of the Ford Motor Company. However, he explained such 
approval would have to be given 1f reasonable assurances could be given to 
Ford Motor of the ability of the Hogles to operate the Ford dealership and if 
the Hogles had proceeded, as they agreed, with Ford Motor Credit Company. 
36. That the individual defendants breached their agreements to 
purchase Larson Ford Sales by falling to negotiate substitute collateral 
agreements with the various banks to which liability was owed, failing to 
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negotiate substitute guarantees with Ford Motor Credit Company, falling to 
supply the needed capital to keep the utilities and other operations of the 
business 1n working order, failing to purchase all of the assets of the 
business, and failing to subsequently execute other agreements and fully 
cooperate in executing those agreements to the degree necessary to fully 
carry out the terms of the March 5, 1983, agreement. 
37. That Just before the expiration of the exclusive period for him to 
file his amended plan as a debtor in possession before the Bankruptcy Court, 
the defendants failed to honor their obligations agreed to in the March 1983 
agreement 1n order to submit a plan that would comply with acceptance of the 
major creditors (to wit, the banks, the Small Business Administration and the 
State Tax Commission}. 
38. That the plan submitted on March 25, 1983, was objected to on April 
11 by Citizens Bank and Commercial Security Bank and Ford Motor Company. 
Both of the banks were to have been contacted by the Individual defendants, 
and according to the February 4, 1983, agreement) the defendants were to 
negotiate substitute collateral to accomplish the release of Walter Larson's 
personal liability from these banks. Ford Motor Company, in its April 11 
objection to approval of disclosure, stated that documentation by HBGH had 
not been submitted; 1n particular, the names of the officers, directors, and 
shareholders, experience of these people, financial information of the 
corporation, the source and amount of available funds, pro forma financial 
Information, and the steps that the corporation would use to get the neces-
sary flooring and secure the new and used car inventory. The failure to 
provide this information caused Ford Motor Company to object to the March 
plan. 
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39. That the defendants left the business and canceled the escrow and 
the contract prior to June 10, 1983, the date confirmation of the Stephen 
Wade plan occurred. _<• 
DATED this IV day of Jtttft 19fk 
u)u&Z' 
WALTER P. LARSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /£ day of <%*r^ 
yu+J&i-
Notary Public 
f *F^&. BRADLEY P. SIMONAR 
OFFICIAL SEAL C. 
NOTAIfir PUBLIC • CALIFORNIA % 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE M ' 
SAN OIEGO COUNTY 
My Commission Expires Decwnber 8. 1995 
1992. 
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ADDENDUM N 
'/-as / ^i 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen C. Hogle 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON and SYBIL 
LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Counter-
Defendants , 
vs. 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al. 
Defendants and Counter-
Claimants. 
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
TO DEFENDANTS JAMES HOGLE, JR. 
AND OWEN C. HOGLE 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Defendants, James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle, respond to 
Plaintiffs1 First Set of Requests for Admissions to Defendants 
James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle as follows: 
1. Admit that on January 15, 1983, James Hogle attended a 
meeting with Dennis Gay, Steve Bruno, and Walter P. Larson. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
2. Admit that during the January 15, 1983, meeting James 
Hogle indicated that he was one of the wealthy individuals on whose 
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behalf was signed the January 13, 1990, Earnest Money Agreement to 
purchase the assets and liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
3. Admit that in January or February, 1983 Walter P. Larson 
gave a tour of the premises of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. to James 
Hogle, Jr., Steven Brown, Owen C. Hogle and the Realtor from 
Wardley Real Estate. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
4. Admit that in January, 1983 you were interested in 
purchasing Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
5. Admit that on January 13, 1983, an Earnest Money Offer was 
made to Wardley Real Estate Company from Western Slope Development 
which had been incorporated the day before to purchase Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. for a total purchase price of $150,000.00. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 5 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
6. Admit that the Earnest Money Offer, referred to in the 
preceding request, contained certain contingencies, to-wit: 
approval by Ford Motor Company of the franchise transfer, pur-
chasers' inspection and approval of the property lease, assets of 
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the business, and inspection and approval of the findings of his 
agent after inspection of the books and records of Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No, 6 as 
it calls for a legal conclusion and that the document referred to 
speaks for itself. 
7. Admit that on February 17, 1983, Walter P. Larson met with 
James Hogle, and others, to extend time within which the conditions 
contained in said Earnest Money Agreement must be satisfied. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 7 as 
it is vague and ambiguous as to which conditions the plaintiffs are 
referring. 
8. Admit that James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle before March 
11, 1983 interviewed and hired Jerry Christensen to be the manager 
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
9. Admit that on August 31, 1982, Larson Ford SAles, Inc., 
Inc. filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
10. Admit that on March 23, 1983, HBGH, Inc. was identified 
in a first Amended Disclosure Statement, filed with the Bankruptcy 
Court, as having been formed for the specific purpose of purchasing 
the assets of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
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ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No, 10 in 
that the document referred to speaks for itself. 
11. Admit that Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay agreed to 
specific funding and financial backing of HBGH to facilitate and 
properly fund the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 11 as 
it is vague and ambiguous as to the specific funding being referred 
to. 
12. Admit that Owen C. Hogle filed his personal financial 
statement and resume along with the Disclosure Statement filed in 
the Bankruptcy Court in the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. Bankruptcy. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 12 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
13. Admit that on April 21, 1983, the Amended Disclosure 
Statement, filed in the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. Bankruptcy 
proceeding, was modified to disclose the investors and purchasers 
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., as being Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay, 
among others. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 13 in 
that the document referred to speaks for itself. 
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14. Admit that the anonymous investors, not identified in the 
disclosure statement referred to in the preceding request, were 
alleged to have cash reserves available in an amount of 
$500,000.00. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 14 as 
being vague and ambiguous. 
15. Admit that on March 2, 1983, a finderfs fee agreement to 
Wardley Corporation was signed by Dennis Gay, Stephen P. Bruno, 
James Hogle, Jr., and Owen C Hogle. 
ANSWER; Admitted. 
16. Admit that on March 5, 1983, an escrow agreement was 
signed by HBGH, Inc. and Walter P. Larson. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
17. Admit that the letters in HBGH, Inc. stand for Hogle, 
Bruno, Gay, and Hogle. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
18. Admit that on March 8, 1983, you paid the payroll of 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
19. Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle 
became an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
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20. Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle, as 
an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., re-hired all of Larson Ford 
Sales' employees. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
21. Admit that Owen C. Hogle established the office directly 
opposite the office of Walter P. Larson at the dealership, and that 
Owen C. Hogle directed the affairs of Larson Ford Sales from that 
office. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
22. Admit Owen C. Hogle maintained the above office so that 
he could monitor and protect his investment in Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
23. Admit that Owen C. Hogle personally acknowledged to 
Walter P. Larson that the operation of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. was 
his [Owen C. Hogle1s] responsibility. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
24. Admit that Owen C. Hogle directly represented to the 
Plaintiffs that he was personally and financially responsible for 
the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
25. Admit that you directly represented to the Plaintiffs 
that you would operate, fund, and manage Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
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ANSWER: Denied. 
26. Admit that you directly represented to Plaintiffs that 
you would resolve problems concerning certain loans made by 
Commercial Security Bank, Citizen's Bank, and the Small Business 
Administration made to Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
27. Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that 
you would provide Ford Motor Credit Company with personal financial 
statements and assume the guarantee contract under Ford Motor 
Credit Company's ninety (90) day repurchase agreement with Walter 
P. Larson and Larson Ford. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
28. Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that 
you would cooperate and commit the financial resources as were 
necessary under the confirmed bankruptcy plan to operate Larson 
Ford Sales, Inc., Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
29. Admit that pursuant to Utah State law, Owen C. Hogle, as 
an owner of Larson Ford, provided, through his own insurance 
company, an automobile dealer bond in order for Larson Ford to 
operate as a dealer with the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 29 in 
that it calls for a legal conclusion. 
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30• Admit that Owen C. Hogle, in his own handwriting, caused 
memos to be written to Larson Ford employees defining procedures 
to be followed, as well as penalties to be inflicted on employees 
who failed to comply. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 3 0 as 
being vague and ambiguous. 
31. Admit that Owen C. Hogle proceeded, as owner of Larson 
Ford, to cause certain advertising slogans to be painted on the 
showroom windows of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
32. Admit that Owen C. Hogle obtained his own funds to pay 
obligations of Larson Ford Sales as owner of Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
33. Admit that Owen C. Hogle met in the Salt Lake office of 
the Ford Motor Credit Company with Park Larson and Denny Anderson, 
Ford Motor Credit Branch Manager, at which time Owen C. Hogle was 
introduced by Park Larson to Mr. Anderson as the new owner of 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
34. Admit that Owen C. Hogle agreed to provide personal 
financial statements to Ford Motor Credit with the intent for Hogle 
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to assume the liability for new vehicle flooring for Larson Ford 
to be provided by Ford Motor Credit Company. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
35. Admit that Owen C. Hogle terminated all Larson Ford Sales 
employees as soon as he took ownership control of Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. and that he then proceeded to interview and re-hire 
those employees he wanted to retain. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
36. Admit that Owen C. Hogle, as owner, and Jerry Christen-
sen, as Manager, met often in the Hogle Larson Ford office at which 
time Hogle gave Christensen instructions and directions relating 
to the operation and management of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
37. Admit that Owen C. Hogle gave specific verbal instruc-
tions to Larson Ford Sales lot boy employees that the lot boys were 
to no longer run personal errands for Park Larson or his family and 
not to go to Park's home in connection with personal favors for 
Park Larson. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
38. Admit you have personally advanced over $150,000 in 
monies and nearly two months of time in the daily operations of 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
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39. Admit that since 1983 you were silent investors with 
Steven Bruno or various real estate investments. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 39 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
40. Admit that your attorney, Harold Stephens, in Compliant 
No. 87-6053, claimed that the ostensible ownership of a closely 
held corporation in the names of Dennis Gay, Kees Versteeg, Tony 
Versteeg and Steve Bruno did not represent you and their hidden 
equity interest in that closely held corporation. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 40 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
41. Admit HBGH incorporated on March 22, without mentioning 
you as participants. 
ANSWER; Admitted. 
42. Admit that you allowed Stephen Bruno and/or Dennis Gay 
to represent that they acted in your name in purchasing the assets 
and assuming the liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
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43. Admit that during all or part of 1982 and 1983 Harold 
Stephens represented you as your attorney. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 43 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
44. Admit that in 1983 you hired and paid with your funds, 
a CPA, D. Clark Brown, to represent you with the investigating and 
purchasing of Larson Ford Sales. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 44 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
45. Admit that you signed the March 2, 1983, Finder's Fee 
Agreement a copy of which is attached hereto. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
DATED this J 0^day of January, 1991. 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
/Hfrry Caston 
_ :torneys for Defendants 
James and Owen Hogle 
CASTON\HOGLOW01.ATR 
HARRY CASTON (4009) 
SHAWN D. TURNER (5813) 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr. 
and Owen C. Hogle 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON 
and JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Counter-
Defendants , 
vs. 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W. 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al. 
Defendants and Counter-
Claimants . 
AMENDED ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO 
DEFENDANTS JAMES HOGLE, JR. 
AND OWEN C. HOGLE 
Civil No. C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Defendants, James Hogle Jr. and Owen C. Hogle, amend their 
Answers to Plaintiffs1 First Set of Requests for Admissions to 
Defendants James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle as follows: 
1. Admit that on January 15, 1983, James Hogle attended a 
meeting with Dennis Gay, Steve Bruno, and Walter P. Larson. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
2. Admit that during the January 15, 1983, meeting James 
Hogle indicated that he was one of the wealthy individuals on whose 
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behalf was signed the January 13, 1990 Earnest Money Agreement to 
purchase the assets and liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
3. Admit that in January or February, 1983 Walter P. Larson 
gave a tour of the premises of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. to James 
Hogle, Jr., Steven Brown, Owen C. Hogle and the Realtor from 
Wardley Real Estate. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
4. Admit that in January 1983 you were interested in 
purchasing Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
5. Admit that on January 13, 1983, an Earnest Money Offer was 
made to Wardley Real Estate Company from Western Slope Development 
which had been incorporated the day before to purchase Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. for a total purchase price of $150,000.00. 
ANSWER; Denied. Defendants, James and Owen Hogle, have 
reviewed the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase of January 
13, 1983, but have no knowledge or information upon which to base 
a belief as to whether Western Slope Development was incorporated 
on January 12, 1983. 
6. Admit that the Earnest Money Offer, referred to in the 
preceding request, contained certain contingencies, to-wit; 
approval by Ford Motor Company of the franchise transfer, pur-
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chasers1 inspection and approval of the property lease, assets of 
the business, and inspection and approval of the findings of his 
agent after inspection of the books and records of Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 6 as 
it calls for a legal conclusion and that the document referred to 
speaks for itself. 
7. Admit that on February 17, 1983, Walter P. Larson met with 
James Hogle, and others, to extend time within which the conditions 
contained in said Earnest Money Agreement must be satisfied. 
ANSWER; Denied. James Hogle met with plaintiff, Walter P. 
Larson, on one occasion. That meeting took place at the dealer-
ship. 
8. Admit that James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle before March 
11, 1983 interviewed and hired Jerry Christensen to be the manager 
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
9. Admit that on August 31, 1982, Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 
Inc. filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. 
ANSWER; Admitted. 
10. Admit that on March 23, 1983, HBGH, Inc. was identified 
in a first Amended Disclosure Statement, filed with the Bankruptcy 
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Court, as having been formed for the specific purpose of purchas-
ing the assets of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 10 in 
that the document referred to speaks for itself. 
11. Admit that Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay agreed to 
specific funding and financial backing of HBGH to facilitate and 
properly fund the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 11 as 
it is vague and ambiguous as to the specific funding being referred 
to. 
12. Admit that Owen C. Hogle filed his personal financial 
statement and resume along with the Disclosure Statement filed in 
the Bankruptcy Court in the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. bankruptcy. 
ANSWER: Denied. Owen C. Hogle's personal financial statement 
and resume were provided to Defendants Bruno and Gay and Ford Motor 
Company. 
13. Admit that on April 21, 1983, the Amended Disclosure 
Statement, filed in the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. bankruptcy 
proceeding, was modified to disclose the investors and purchasers 
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., as being Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay, 
among others. 
ANSWER: Denied. Defendants, James and Owen C. Hogle, are not 
aware of any document which indicated that these defendants were 
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the purchasers of Larson Ford. These defendants had agreed to fund 
HBGH, which was contemplating the purchase of Larson Ford. 
14. Admit that the anonymous investors, not identified in the 
disclosure statement referred to in the preceding request, were 
alleged to have cash reserves available in an amount of 
$500,000.00. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
15. Admit that on March 2, 1983, a finder's fee agreement to 
Wardley Corporation was signed by Dennis Gay, Stephen P. Bruno, 
James Hogle, Jr., and Owen C. Hogle. 
ANSWER; Admitted. 
16. Admit that on March 5, 1983, an escrow agreement was 
signed by HBGH, Inc. and Walter P. Larson. 
ANSWER; Admitted. 
17. Admit that the letters in HBGH, Inc. stand for Hogle, 
Bruno, Gay, and Hogle. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
18. Admit that on March 8, 1983, you paid the payroll of 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
19. Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle 
became an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
6 
20. Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle, as 
an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., re-hired all of Larson Ford 
Sales' employees. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
21. Admit that Owen C. Hogle established the office directly 
opposite the office of Walter P. Larson at the dealership, and that 
Owen C. Hogle directed the affairs of Larson Ford Sales from that 
office. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
22. Admit Owen C Hogle maintained the above office so that 
he could monitor and protect his investment in Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
23. Admit that Owen C. Hogle personally acknowledged to 
Walter P. Larson that the operation of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. was 
his [Owen C. Hoglefs] responsibility. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
24. Admit that Owen C Hogle directly represented to the 
Plaintiffs that he was personally and financially responsible for 
the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
25. Admit that you directly represented to the Plaintiffs 
that you would operate, fund, and manage Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
7 
ANSWER: Denied. 
26. Admit that you directly represented to Plaintiffs that 
you would resolve problems concerning certain loans made by 
Commercial Security Bank, Citizen's Bank, and the Small Business 
Administration made to Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
27. Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that 
you would provide Ford Motor Credit Company with personal financial 
statements and assume the guarantee contract under Ford Motor 
Credit Company's ninety (90) days repurchase agreement with Walter 
P. Larson and Larson Ford. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
28. Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that 
you would cooperate and commit the financial resources as were 
necessary under the confirmed bankruptcy plan to operate Larson 
Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
29. Admit that pursuant to Utah State law, Owen C. Hogle, as 
an owner of Larson Ford, provided, through his own insurance 
company, an automobile dealer bond in order for Larson Ford to 
operate as a dealer with the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles. 
ANSWER: Denied. Defendant Owen C. Hogle is not aware of any 
documents in which he identified himself as owner of Larson Ford. 
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30. Admit that Owen C. Hogle, in his own handwriting, caused 
memos to be written to Larson Ford employees defining procedures 
to be followed, as well as penalties to be inflicted on employees 
who failed to comply. 
ANSWER: Denied. Owen C. Hogle does recall writing a 
memorandum to employees; however, he never defined procedures or 
penalties. 
31. Admit that Owen C. Hogle proceeded, as owner of Larson 
Ford, to cause certain advertising slogans to be painted on the 
showroom windows of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
32. Admit that Owen C. Hogle obtained his own funds to pay 
obligations of Larson Ford Sales as owner of Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
33. Admit that Owen C. Hogle met in the Salt Lake office of 
the Ford Motor Credit Company with Park Larson and Denny Anderson, 
Ford Motor Credit Branch Manager, at which time Owen C. Hogle was 
introduced by Park Larson to Mr. Anderson as the new owner of 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
34. Admit that Owen C. Hogle agreed to provide personal 
financial statements to Ford Motor Credit with the intent for Hogle 
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to assume the liability for new vehicle flooring for Larson Ford 
to be provided by Ford Motor Credit Company. 
ANSWER; Denied. 
35. Admit that Owen C. Hogle terminated all Larson Ford Sales 
employees as soon as he took ownership control of Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. and that he then proceeded to interview and re-hire 
those employees he wanted to retain. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
36. Admit that Owen C. Hogle, as owner, and Jerry Christen-
sen, as Manager, met often in the Hogle Larson Ford office at which 
time Hogle gave Christensen instructions and directions relating 
to the operation and management of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
37. Admit that Owen C. Hogle gave specific verbal instruc-
tions to Larson Ford Sales lot boy employees that the lot boys were 
to no longer run personal errands for Park Larson or his family and 
not to go to Park's home in connection with personal favors for 
Park Larson. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
38. Admit you have personally advanced over $150,000 in 
monies and nearly two months of time in the daily operations of 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
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39. Admit that since 1983 you were silent investors with 
Steven Bruno or various real estate investments. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 39 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
40. Admit that your attorney, Harold Stephens, in Complaint 
No. 87-6053, claimed that the ostensible ownership of a closely 
held corporation in the names of Dennis Gay, Kees Versteeg, Tony 
Versteeg and Steve Bruno did not represent you and their hidden 
equity interest in that closely held corporation. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 40 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
41. Admit HBGH incorporated on March 22, without mentioning 
you as participants. 
ANSWER; Admitted. 
42. Admit that you allowed Stephen Bruno and/or Dennis Gay 
to represent that they acted in your name in purchasing the assets 
and assuming the liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
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43. Admit that during all or part of 1982 and 1983 Harold 
Stephens represented you as your attorney. 
ANSWER; Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 43 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
44. Admit that in 1983 you hired and paid with your funds, 
a CPA, D. Clark Brown, to represent you with the investigating and 
purchasing of Larson Ford Sales. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 44 as 
it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
45. Admit that you signed the March 2, 1983, Finder1s Fee 
Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto. 
ANSWER: Admitted. 
DATED this r day of November, 1991. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
BY. L-g? -Z 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorneys for Defendants 
James and Owen C. Hogle 
CASTON\HOGUA03.ANS 
